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ID:
118672
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent discoveries in the Russian military archives shed new light on the actions of General Nikolay Vatutin, the commander of the Voronezh front during the Battle of Kursk.
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| 2 |
ID:
118671
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates the lack of Russian-language monographs about the Russian participation in the First World War. Discussing a number of recent and older works that have been published, the article suggests that the surprising lack of Russian interest has much to do with the continued unease felt in Russia about the Great War. This does not fit into the heroic image Russians (and particularly the current government) prefer to cherish about their past. The article in addition supplies the reader with a fairly comprehensive overview of recent English-language as well as Soviet, émigré, and post-Soviet Russian-language works on Russia in the Great War.
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| 3 |
ID:
118669
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes whether the military commander Jan Capek of Sány betrayed the radical Hussites in the Battle of Lipany on the 30 May 1434. In contrast to the prevailing view of previous literature, the author comes to the conclusion, based on an analysis of the sources, that Jan Capek of Sány was not a traitor. His betrayal is not supported by period sources nor have reasons been found as to why he would betray his co-warriors. The coalition of moderate Hussites and Catholics achieved victory in the battle thanks to military cunning, wherein they pretended to flee in order to draw their enemies from their position. Upon reaching too great a distance from their barricade of wagons, the enemy was routed in the open fields.
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| 4 |
ID:
118666
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It has long been widely assumed that Russia has been an ally of the Serbs and that it was in particular an anti-Western supporter of Belgrade during the wars of the 1990s. In fact, Russia, in cahoots with the Western powers and NATO, played a game of deception to make it appear that it was 'anti-Serbian' when in reality it acted as 'errand boy' in order to fulfill the West's objectives in the former Yugoslavia.
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| 5 |
ID:
118665
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
U.S.-Russian political relations took a turn for the worse in 2011-2012, especially in the latter year, a presidential election year in both the United States and Russia. Among the issues in contention as between Washington and Moscow was the American and NATO plan for phased deployment of missile defenses in Europe. Some prominent Russian officials and military experts regarded the proposed European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) plan for European missile defenses as a prospective threat to Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent. Russia's objections to NATO's missiles defenses are as much political as they are military-technical, and the 2012 return of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency renders uncertain the future of the U.S.-Russian 'reset' launched during the early years of the Obama administration.
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| 6 |
ID:
118667
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2012.
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This article concerns the Soviet military's use of soldiers of Afghan ethnicities (Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, and others) during its war in Afghanistan, both as spetsnaz and more generally in the 40th army. Special Forces Detachment 154 and Special Forces Detachment 177, the first and second 'Muslim Battalions,' would play important roles not only during the palace takeover in December 1979 but also during the 1983 cease-fire in Panjshir. This article challenges earlier views that Soviet Muslims and Central Asians were unreliable soldiers who colluded with mujahedin, and points to a more balanced perspective of their role in Afghanistan.
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| 7 |
ID:
118670
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Behind every successful armored force in World War II was an effective tank repair organization. Historians and readers have long focused on heroic battles and minute comparisons of each side's tanks, but without maintenance even the most skillfully-led tank division could not have advanced very far. Here for the first time in English is an analysis of the Red Army's tank repair capability and its significance to the final victory.
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| 8 |
ID:
118668
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| Publication |
2012.
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In recent years there has been an increased interest in the legacy of the Fourteenth Grenadier Division of the Waffen-SS, known as the Waffen-SS Galizien, a Ukrainian volunteer formation formed in 1943. In Ukrainian ultra-nationalist mythology the unit is depicted as freedom fighters who fought for an independent Ukraine, its collaboration with Nazi Germany dismissed as "Soviet propaganda." There is a widening gulf between the myth and the picture that emerges from the archival materials. This article revisits the history of the unit, with a particular focus on aspects of its history which the myth makers omit or deny: its ideological foundations, its allegiance to Adolf Hitler, and the involvement of units associated with the division in atrocities against civilians in 1944.
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