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| 1 |
ID:
120284
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article distills insights for the scholarship of deterrence by examining the 1983 nuclear crisis - the moment of maximum danger of the late Cold War. Important contributions notwithstanding, our understanding of this episode still has caveats, and a significant pool of theoretical lessons for strategic studies remain to be learned. Utilizing newly available sources, this article suggests an alternative interpretation of Soviet and US conduct. It argues that the then US deterrence strategy almost produced Soviet nuclear overreaction by nearly turning a NATO exercise into a prelude to a preventive Soviet attack. Building on historical findings, this article offers insights about a mechanism for deterrence effectiveness evaluation, recommends establishing a structure responsible for this endeavor, and introduces a new theoretical term to the strategic studies lexicon - a 'culminating point of deterrence'.
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| 2 |
ID:
173419
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| Summary/Abstract |
Andrew W. Marshall, who shaped the way in which contemporary international security experts think about strategy, has been mostly associated with the invention of net assessment. The intellectual sources of this analytical technique, and of the related competitive strategies concept, could be traced to Marshall’s efforts to uncover Soviet post-World War II defense transformations. This article outlines the essence of these Soviet innovations – the empirical frame of reference that inspired Marshall. It provides a new perspective on the history of the net-assessment methodology, advances the debate within strategic studies over the nature of military innovations, and offers insights for experts examining defense transformations worldwide.
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| 3 |
ID:
170038
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| Summary/Abstract |
In Syria, the Russian Orthodox Church became a tool of genuine strategic influence, and that role is likely to continue.
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| 4 |
ID:
172056
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article hypothesizes about the impact that the Russian combat practice in Syria might have had on the operational art of Hezbollah. Three years of joint fighting with the Russian military has been a major formative experience for the organization. Presumably, this profound and diverse practice is likely to shape Hezbollah's subsequent military transformation, and to project on its force buildup tendencies, organizational structures and concept of operations. The article argues that Hezbollah's most profound takeaway from the Russian approach might relate to the notion of the reconnaissance-strike complex and its main segments—intelligence capabilities, command and control, and the element related to the actual use of force (Strike). Although this article aims to facilitate critical discussion about potential adaptations in Hezbollah's art of strategy and operations, its insights extend beyond the case itself, as they might be indicative of other hybrid nonstate actors in the Middle East and elsewhere.
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| 5 |
ID:
168934
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Russian Orthodox Church plays an immense role in current Russian national security policy. The intertwining of the church and the strategic community is nowhere more visible than in the nuclear-weapons complex, where the priesthood has penetrated all levels of command, been involved in operational activities, and positioned itself as a provider of meanings for, and guardian of, the state’s nuclear potential. The first work to highlight the phenomenon of the Russian church-nuclear nexus, this article focuses on the ecclesiastical impact on Russian nuclear command and control. The findings suggest that it is not inconceivable that the Russian military clergy—like the Soviet political officers and contrary to chaplains worldwide—might become future participants in decision making on matters of national security, and that de facto there might be two parallel chains of command authority emerging in Russia, with potential tensions between them. The article outlines the causes of this overlooked singularity and its implications for the theory and practice of international security.
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