| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
175280
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Research on clientelism emphasizes the use of brokers to mobilize voters. To utilize these agents efficiently, politicians must learn about brokers’ relative abilities and allocate scarce resources accordingly. Drawing upon a hand-coded dataset based on the archives of Gustavo Capanema, a powerful mid-twentieth-century congressman from Minas Gerais, Brazil, this paper offers the first direct evidence of such learning dynamics. The analysis concentrates on Brazil’s pre-secret ballot era, a time when measuring broker performance was particularly straightforward. Consistent with theories of political learning, the data demonstrate that resource flows to local machines were contingent on the deviation between actual and expected votes received in previous elections. Moreover, given politicians’ ability to discern mobilization capacity, payments to brokers were highly effective in bringing out the vote.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
120319
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Why do some terrorist groups participate in the electoral process but not others? If elections provide some strategic or tactical benefit then we would expect other groups to emulate that strategy. However, we see variation in the adoption of an electoral strategy by terrorist groups. I argue that involvement in territorial disputes and group competition determine whether terrorist groups embrace an electoral strategy. Conflicts involving territorial disputes are more likely to see terrorist groups contest elections because electoral participation may aid in the creation of the independent or autonomous territory they desire. Increased group competition changes the number of actors, which impacts the level and distribution of resources (supporters, finance, and arms) involved in the conflict. When multiple terrorist groups compete, groups are motivated to participate in elections in response to new competitive pressures. This argument is tested using a large-n dataset of 89 terrorist groups in existence during the years 1968-2006 and a case study of Hamas's decision to contest elections.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
172239
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines why incumbents facing non-violent demonstrations resign or remain in office. It presents a theoretical framework to analyse five major anti-government protests in Bulgaria (1990–2014) and select protests in Serbia, Romania and Macedonia. Incumbents remain in office if they perceive both the extra-institutional and electoral threats to them as low and unlikely to increase. They resign if either threat is high or increasing. To remove incumbents from power, peaceful protesters must employ an electoral strategy. This article builds on the social movement and colour revolution literatures, while underscoring the relationship between barricades and ballots.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|