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| 1 |
ID:
132093
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| 2 |
ID:
163448
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| Summary/Abstract |
is study explores how local o cials tolerate and use mass mobilization to extract policy concessions from above. Local o cials strategically tolerate mass mobilization when the demands of the masses are
congruent with elements of their own agenda that they are otherwise
unable to pursue. Protestors in the streets turn out to be a powerful
bargaining chip for local o cials: they illustrate ex ante that higher
level leaders risk causing social instability if they reject the masses’
demands. e article lays out the institutional environment that gives
rise to such a strategy, presents a detailed case study focusing on the
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| 3 |
ID:
140838
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| Summary/Abstract |
Faced with the rising threat of social instability, the central government in China has launched the rebuilding of social security system since 2002. Local governments, especially city- and county-level governments, are the principal agents implementing this ambitious policy initiative. However, the achievements in establishing social security system vary significantly, even among locales in the same province. In order to identify the factors causing divergence of outcomes, this article compares two similar county-level cities with different social security system performances. Through extensive interviews with key actors, the authors found that the development of local social security system is highly related to the nature of the relationship between local governments and local businesses which is shaped by specific economic development paths. This finding sheds light on the rationale of local governments’ selective implementation of central policies, and why social security systems in some localities but not others may “race to the bottom” in the competition for capital.
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| 4 |
ID:
120620
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper provides a survey of the economic literature relevant to social instability in China and moulds it into an argument. The objective is to offer a fresh view of economic policy and performance through the lens of the threat posed by social instability. This is a concept that economists rarely analyse, and yet it can lurk behind much economic policy-making. China's leadership has often publicly expressed its concern to avoid 'social instability'. It is viewed as a threat both to the political order and to the continued rapid growth of the economy. This threat to growth in turn endangers the maintenance of social stability. The paper examines the likely economic determinants of social instability, using both surveys and other evidence. After discussing the determinants of China's rapid growth, the paper goes on to examine the likely mechanisms by which social instability can affect the growth rate. There is a case for more research on the role of social instability in the economic development process.
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| 5 |
ID:
130978
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's leaders have often expressed concerns about social instability, viewed as a threat both to the political order and to continued rapid growth. Slower growth might, in turn, further undermine social stability. Using survey data, the present paper examines the economic determinants of social instability. Four main determinants are identified: past and expected growth of income, income inequality, economic insecurity and misgovernance. The paper then considers possible policies to reduce social instability, examining each of the determinants in turn.
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