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ID:
120668
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
This essay explores how the Baltic republics responded to the crisis of 2008-2011. We argue that while there are significant differences in how the Baltic economies responded to the crisis, these responses not only remain within the neo-liberal policy paradigm characteristic of the region from the early 1990s, but that the crisis radicalised Baltic economies and particularly their fiscal stance. We show that there are a number of unique features in all three Baltic republics' political economies that made such a radicalisation possible. However, these unique features make it almost impossible for the Baltic experience to be replicable anywhere else in Europe.
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2 |
ID:
180708
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Summary/Abstract |
IN 2015, a collection of articles was published in Latvia on two paramount issues - money and power.1 The articles are about money one wants to get from someone else in order to remain in power. It wasn't the first book of this kind, nor, of course, the last one. But it wasn't an ordinary book - it had been prepared for an important occasion. In December 2015, the justice ministers of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia signed a declaration setting out a plan to calculate damages supposedly inflicted on the three countries by the USSR, demand that Russia pay them compensation, and make assessments of Soviet crimes from an international point of view.
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3 |
ID:
141405
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Summary/Abstract |
MOSCOW — This may be hard to imagine, but there was a time when the national independence movements in the Baltic states had no greater ally than Russia, and its leader. As Soviet tanks rolled into Vilnius to crush Lithuania’s independence aspirations in January 1991, Boris Yeltsin—speaker of Parliament and head of state of the Russian Federation, then still a constituent part of the USSR—made a strong public stand against the Kremlin’s aggression and backed self-determination for the Baltic republics. In what Western diplomats—and many of his own supporters—considered a “crazy” move, Yeltsin then flew to the Estonian capital of Tallinn to sign a joint statement of mutual support with the leaders of the three Baltic states, as well as separate cooperation treaties with Estonia and Latvia, recognizing their “inalienable right to national independence” in an act that, in the opinion of many observers, prevented further bloodshed. While in Estonia, Yeltsin met with Soviet troops stationed there and urged them to disobey any orders from their Kremlin commanders to crush peaceful demonstrators. On the advice of friends, who had (well-founded) fears that the KGB might try to shoot down his plane, Yeltsin returned to Russia in a private car.
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