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| 1 |
ID:
120874
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
There is a commonly expressed concern that granting territorial concessions to separatist groups may create "domino effects." However, although this statement is largely undisputed within political rhetoric, no firm conclusions have been provided in previous research. The purpose of this study is to systematically examine whether the granting of territorial concessions to an ethnic group does indeed spur new separatist conflicts. I suggest that such domino effects may be generated by two processes. First, the accommodation of an ethnic group's separatist demands may trigger a general inspiration process among other groups within and across borders. Second, by acquiescing to separatist demands, a government signals that it may also yield to the demands of other groups it confronts, making it more likely that other groups choose to pursue secessionism. Statistical analysis of data on territorial concessions globally 1989-2004 provides no evidence of domino effects. This holds true both within and across borders.
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| 2 |
ID:
161555
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| Summary/Abstract |
Barbara Walter’s application of reputation theory to self-determination movements has advanced our understanding of why many separatist movements result in armed conflict. Walter has shown that governments of multi-ethnic societies often respond to territorial disputes with violence to deter similar future demands by other ethnic groups. When governments grant territorial accommodation to one ethnic group, they encourage other ethnic groups to seek similar concessions. However, a number of recent empirical studies casts doubt on the validity of Walter’s argument. We address recent challenges to the efficacy of reputation building in the context of territorial conflicts by delineating the precise scope conditions of reputation theory. First, we argue that only concessions granted after fighting should trigger additional conflict onsets. Second, the demonstration effects should particularly apply to groups with grievances against the state. We then test the observable implications of our conditional argument for political power-sharing concessions. Using a global sample of ethnic groups in 120 states between 1946 and 2013, we find support for our arguments. Our theoretical framework enables us to identify the conditions under which different types of governmental concessions are likely to trigger future conflicts, and thus has important implications for conflict resolution.
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