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| 1 |
ID:
173822
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| Summary/Abstract |
Civilian victimization, whether deliberate or collateral, is a common occurrence in civil war. This study investigates patterns of civilian victimization during the 5-year Battle of Aleppo, a major campaign of the Syrian Civil War in which there were 24,462 documented civilian fatalities. We argue that the primary belligerents and their external patrons respond to shifts in the conflict’s strategic balance of power, employing more indiscriminate force when their opponent is gaining advantage, resulting in higher civilian fatalities. A quantitative analysis of the Battle of Aleppo models weekly civilian fatalities as a function of belligerents’ conflict initiation interacted with regime and rebel offensives aimed at shifting the status quo. While regime-initiated conflict events appear to be the primary determinant of civilian fatalities, our analysis finds that conflict events initiated by the opposition forces during periods of rebel offensive gains are associated with fewer civilian casualties, while pro-government external intervention during rebel offensives is associated with elevated civilian fatalities. We expand on these findings through a focused case study of third party intervention during the final year of the battle, with emphasis on the Russian intervention on behalf of the Syrian Regime that broke the opposition’s final counteroffensive.
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| 2 |
ID:
120881
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The overexpansion of alliance portfolios can diminish the overall security of states. Due to the fear of abandonment, states have an interest in expanding the size and capabilities of their alliance portfolio to ensure the receipt of adequate assistance in the event of a conflict. However, each ally's incentive to intervene-their expected reward-decreases as alliance portfolios become larger and more powerful. In such situations, states' efforts to address the alliance abandonment problem may serve to exacerbate it. Hypotheses regarding the influence of alliance portfolio size and capabilities on conflict intervention are tested. Analysis suggests that states must possess some minimal threshold of military capability before an expanded alliance portfolio increases the likelihood of intervention in conflict. Furthermore, states must be mindful of their individual capabilities relative to those of their collective alliance portfolio. States appear capable of adding roughly 1.5 times their own capability through alliances before additional expansion actually decreases the probability of intervention.
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