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| 1 |
ID:
173750
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| Summary/Abstract |
From an obscure sector synonymous with mercenaryism, the private military and security industry has grown to become a significant complementing instrument in military operations. This rise has brought with it a considerable attention. Researchers have examined the role of private military and security companies in international relations as well as the history of these companies, and, above all, the legal implications of their use in the place of military organizations. As research progresses, a significant gap has become clear. Only a handful of studies have addressed the complex of issues associated with contractors’ demographics and lived experience. This article sheds some light over this lacuna, examining contractors’ demographics using descriptive statistics from an original data set of American and British contractors who died in Iraq between the years 2003 and 2016. The article augments our understanding of an important population of post-Fordist-contracted workforce, those peripheral workers supplementing military activity in high-risk occupations with uncertain long-term outcomes.
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| 2 |
ID:
120881
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The overexpansion of alliance portfolios can diminish the overall security of states. Due to the fear of abandonment, states have an interest in expanding the size and capabilities of their alliance portfolio to ensure the receipt of adequate assistance in the event of a conflict. However, each ally's incentive to intervene-their expected reward-decreases as alliance portfolios become larger and more powerful. In such situations, states' efforts to address the alliance abandonment problem may serve to exacerbate it. Hypotheses regarding the influence of alliance portfolio size and capabilities on conflict intervention are tested. Analysis suggests that states must possess some minimal threshold of military capability before an expanded alliance portfolio increases the likelihood of intervention in conflict. Furthermore, states must be mindful of their individual capabilities relative to those of their collective alliance portfolio. States appear capable of adding roughly 1.5 times their own capability through alliances before additional expansion actually decreases the probability of intervention.
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