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| 1 |
ID:
120541
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
With abundant resources and growing markets, the African continent is once again at the centre of a new 'great game of courtship' between the established and rising powers. However, compared with previous decades, African countries are no longer passive players in international relations.
This article explores Africa's recent negotiating behaviour in relation to a selected set of actors that animate the current shifting global economic order: rising powers, established powers and international organizations. Despite potential sources of bargaining leverage, most African countries (with some notable exceptions) are still reactive to the bilateral overtures of Brazil, China and India and unable to set the terms of engagement.
Nonetheless, the rise of these new powers provides alternative negotiating partners (and potentially more developmental outcomes) to the established powers. By comparison, at the multilateral level the African Group has been far more active and assertive in contesting global governance in the pursuit of greater distributive justice, particularly in the climate, trade and security regimes. This has taken place largely through the adroit use of distributive bargaining and tactics, supplemented by normative-based strategies highlighting Africa's underdevelopment.
The central argument of the article is that African countries require judicious negotiating strategies, improved deliberative capacities and coalitions with local/continental/global civil society and business networks in order to ameliorate their weaker bargaining power and reshape the terms of their engagement with their international partners, particularly the rising powers.
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| 2 |
ID:
120540
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the extent to which the European Union (EU) has responded effectively to the rising powers of Asia, Latin America and Africa, and whether the Union has been able to construct an effective diplomacy for dealing with them.
It starts from the observation that the EU has significantly developed its diplomatic apparatus since the Lisbon Treaty, and that this apparatus is largely directed towards the establishment of negotiated order at the regional and global levels. The article identifies a number of tensions and contradictions that arise from the EU's status and role in the global arena and that feed into its quest for negotiated order.
It goes on to assess the challenges to EU positions and strategies that arise not only from the emergence of new powers in the world arena, but also from the changes in global structures and processes that accompany this development.
The article then investigates how these challenges have interacted with the search for negotiated order in a series of issue areas: security, commercial policy, development, environment and energy. It argues that in recent years the EU has, in a variety of ways, been taken outside its comfort zone and that while the European Union can and must seek to re-establish negotiated order in its external relations, the challenge of doing so is severe.
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| 3 |
ID:
120536
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Brazilian foreign policy demonstrates an interesting double aspect in the changing global system. Its rhetoric and overt positioning is framed around the idea of Brazil as a value-creating actor, while in reality there are significant value-claiming characteristics at the core of its approach to regional and global affairs.
The key for Brazil is its position as a 'bridge' between the South and the North, which allows its diplomats to establish the country as a critical coalition organizer and ideational leader for southern actors looking for major changes in global governance systems, and a central interlocutor for northern actors trying to cope with pressure from the South. Brazil's ambitions are simple: focusing more on an improved relative position, rather than a complete reformulation of the international system, which serves it well in economic, political and security terms.
To explain this argument the article focuses on Brazilian engagement with Africa and South America, as well as the country's approach to major negotiations such as the WTO's Doha round, the Free Trade Area of the Americas and the evolution of regional governance mechanisms such as the Organization of American States and the recently created Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. The pattern that emerges is one of Brazil working to create a consensus around its position, using its consequent leadership to improve Brazilian leverage in the regional and global arena.
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| 4 |
ID:
120538
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although there is clear dissatisfaction in China with the nature of the current global order, it is hard to find a clear and coherent Chinese vision of what an alternative world might look like. This is partly a result of conflicting understandings within the country of the benefits and drawbacks of taking a more proactive global role and perhaps undertaking more leadership functions. But it is also a consequence of how elites frame Chinese interests and demands in different ways for different audiences.
Furthermore, the existing order has in fact served China quite well in its transition towards becoming a global power. So while at times China appears to be the main driver for reform and change, at other times (or to other people) the emphasis is on China as a responsible stakeholder in the existing system.
How others receive and interpret these conflicting signals is likely to be influenced by the way China exercises, rather than talks about, its growing power - perhaps most notably in terms of its territorial claims in the South and East China Seas and its role as a regional power.
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| 5 |
ID:
120537
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates India's negotiation behaviour as a rising power and aims to help in the mediation of a polarized scholarly debate that either sees India as a 'natural ally' of the West, or as an unreformed and revisionist Third Worldist power. It argues that the key to understanding India's negotiation behaviour lies in examining with whom it is negotiating.
Rising India, even though it has a closer relationship with the West today than it has for many years, remains a negotiating partner that resorts frequently to distributive negotiation strategies, uses moralistic framing and resists bandwagoning. Its relations with the rising powers, too, reveal some degree of distributive bargaining, and it plays hardball with multinational companies and within international organizations.
Interestingly, and in contrast to its dominant bargaining behaviour with these different players, India's pattern of behaviour is different when dealing with smaller players. Here, it has consistently used integrative bargaining strategies, formed southern coalitions and shown willingness to share the burdens of international responsibility.
The differences in behaviour suggest that India is perhaps not reluctant to be a responsible power per se, but that it sees itself as owing its responsibility to different constituencies. The conceptualization of these responsibilities is still evolving, opening up some space for negotiation and influence for India and its negotiating partners, with regard to which the article offers some policy recommendations.
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| 6 |
ID:
120542
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The role of private non-state actors in global governance has focused largely on western actors, notably firms and non-governmental organizations. The rise of new economic powers presents us with an opportunity to consider whether and how the place of non-state actors might evolve. This is particularly true where emerging market firms are concerned, as they are the most obvious manifestation of the shift in economic power away from the developed West and Japan.
The article suggests, however, that the current international system satisfies most of the demands that firms from rising powers might make, so they have little incentive to define their policy preferences in opposition to established powers. They can conduct political activity across a range of avenues, from multilateral institutions to regulatory bodies overseeing technical aspects of business operations.
Indeed, the disaggregation of modern capitalism makes the last route particularly important and attractive for firms. As such, they do not need to frame their policy demands solely - or even mainly - in terms of balancing against western economic dominance.
For non-governmental organizations, the emerging power structure has eroded their previous role of advocates for developing economies. The economic growth of emerging markets has, however, given NGOs an opportunity to work with multinationals in the provision of public goods.
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| 7 |
ID:
120535
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The purpose of this special issue is to analyse the negotiation of power transition in the international system today. This introductory article provides the theoretical frame that guided all the contributors, and serves as the collective starting point for this project.
The framework focuses on three sets of issues. First, it highlights the importance of studying the relations between the key actors, rather than focusing solely on the perspective of any one group of players. It identifies five sets of key actors: the rising powers, the established powers, small and marginalized states, private actors (that attempt to harness the ongoing changes to their advantage and are in turn used by various state actors), and, finally, international organizations and other mechanisms of global governance (as loci, objects and also facilitators of international bargaining).
Second, the article facilitates an analysis of the relations between these actors; it offers the lens of negotiation analysis that focuses specifically on the variables of negotiation strategy, coalitions and framing.
Third, the article suggests potential implications of this collective study. These include new insights into the motivations of the key players, their ability and willingness to assume the responsibilities of international leadership, and how their visions of global order conflict with or reinforce each other.
The latter part of the article offers a summary of the findings, suggests how the individual contributions add up and presents some policy recommendations resulting from the analysis.
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| 8 |
ID:
120543
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Economic convergence of the large emerging economies (Brazil, China and India) on the incumbent industrialized economic powers has produced divergent predictions: rising powers are viewed as challengers of existing global governance or nascent supporters of the status quo. The preferences of rising powers, as revealed in global economic negotiations and international security regimes, indicate that they are moderate reformers that seek greater influence within existing forums and also attempt to safeguard their policy-making autonomy.
Even if their preferences change, the translation of growing economic weight into usable capabilities is not automatic. Domestic political constraints often make the mobilization of capabilities difficult in international bargaining. Strategies of collective action, whether South-South or regional, have not yet produced a consistent increase in bargaining power at the global level.
The counter-strategies of delay and cooptation implemented by the incumbent powers have maintained incumbent influence and enhanced the legitimacy of existing global governance institutions. Risks of conflict remain along three negotiating divides: system friction, distributional conflict and institutional efficiency.
Institutional innovations such as greater transparency, institutional flexibility and construction of informal transnational networks may provide modest insurance against a weakening of global governance and its institutions.
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| 9 |
ID:
120539
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The changing geopolitical landscape is fraying the fabric of US hegemony and compromises the current structures of global order tied to US supremacy. Emerging powers from the 'developing' world, such as China, India and Brazil, are increasingly challenging the US-based order through their individual and collective actions on economic and development governance. They see themselves as lacking a significant stake in the system and have different values than traditional US allies which tend to be advanced liberal democracies.
This article examines how the US is attempting to manage the challenge to its position of primacy in the global order. The main argument is that the US has been slow to recognize this threat and is still ambivalent about how to tackle it. It appears that at this stage the US wants to share the burdens of governance with emerging powers, encouraging them to play the role of 'responsible stakeholders'.
At the same time, however, the US does not wish to relinquish its ability to act unilaterally or to be the main voice in established institutions, such as the UN Security Council or the International Monetary Fund. For this reason, the US has preferred to encourage the involvement of emerging countries in governance through informal settings like the G20, while resisting or being at best lukewarm about the reform of formal governance structures.
The article concludes that if the US continues to pursue this strategy global order is likely to become more fragmented, with formal institutions increasingly losing their power and relevance; this, in turn, will diminish US power and influence.
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