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ID:
119723
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The A400M project was seen as a flagship European armaments cooperation project from its inception. It has been farmed in two different ways ; as a break with inefficient collaborative procurement practices (the commercial fame) and as proof that European interests would outweigh national ones (the European fame).The Project's well-documented difficulties show that neither frame was wholly persuasive, but this raises questions about the viability of EU armaments policy given that it rests largely on the same assumptions.
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| 2 |
ID:
119747
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
India's arms acquisition and technology absorption process remains skewed, even six decades after India's independent existence. It under mines the prefrences of the armed forces and remains overly titled in favour of the civilian technologists.The combination of a policy of autarky, distrust of the military, and the avowed objective of building an indigenous technology base and establishing self - reliance in military preparedness - these factors have together prevented the graduation from a distorted acquisition process to a structured one. Largly in the name of self - reliance, the technologists continue to reign over a regime that is known for its delay and cost over-runs rather than for providing anefficient of delivery. Belated attemts have been made to restore order in the overall state of affairs. However, the success of the technologists belonging to the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), India's primary military Research and Development (R&D) agency, in one field - that of missile technology and missile defence - perpetuate this distortion in the system as a whole.
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| 3 |
ID:
119716
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Israel might attack the Iranian oil industry or the Iranian leadership in order to weaken and if possible to bring down the regime. Yet Israel would probably focus on Iran's nuclear sites. Israel could launch planes, long range missiles and special forces. The United States could give Israel her biggest bunker buster bomb, the GBU-57B and a B-52 to carry it, so Israel could postpone her raid because such an arsenal would allow her to crack Iranian sites even a year from now.Either way the United States might be called help save Israeli air crews.
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| 4 |
ID:
119749
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article is toevaluate Pakista's role in global arms control and disarmament. It discusses how Pakistan supported the international disarmament process and why it later shifted its perception for acquiring nuclear weapons. Also, it broadly analyses Pakistan's concerns about then arms control and disarmament process both at the international and regional level. The author considers that these conserns became the hurdles that keep the two nuclear rivals of South Asia away from the creation of Arms Control Regime (ACR) needed for strategic stability and the security of armed forces in the South Asian region.
Practically, the ACR does not exist in the South Asian strategic environment. This article is a call to address certain tangible and intangible variables which hinder the process of creation of an ACR.
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| 5 |
ID:
119762
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The notion of winning local 'hearts and minds' away from an insurgency is a staple of counterinsurgency theory, and points to the essentially psychological nature of such activities. A burst of 'classic' counterintersurgency writing from the decolonisation struggle of the 1950s and 1960s considers this problem,with some author making strikingly psychological points, though much reference to the extensive social psychological litrature. Perhaps as aresult, some classic tests are psychologically naive. Elswhre though, some less - known counterinsurgency writing was at the cutting edge of social psychology.
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