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| 1 |
ID:
177660
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates whether the United States had prior knowledge of the 1973 oil crisis instituted by Arab countries in 1973. It argues, using predominantly primary source documents, that as early as 1971, Washington understood the Arab nations were willing to use oil as an economic weapon. Furthermore, government officials had drafted contingency plans to ameliorate the enormous deleterious economic impact. Unfortunately, the gridlocked Congress and the erosion of executive power associated with the unfolding of the Watergate scandal thwarted any possibility of the Nixon Administration’s economic response to these developments being implemented. This article contributes new primary source research and contextualizes the crisis within the framework of a gridlocked Congress to add to the existing debate concerning America’s preparations for and failure to respond to the 1973 oil crisis.
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| 2 |
ID:
121155
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The success of any humanitarian aid mission is generally measured by the timeliness of critical supplies that are delivered to the affected area. However, a more interesting analysis may be to determine the effect of the aid on the overall satisfaction of the local population. The authors' research focused on the delivery of humanitarian aid to a notional region that was decimated by flooding with ships, landing craft and security personnel provided by the US Navy and Marines. While the research effort addressed naval force structure, the focus of the research was: (1) to assess different delivery methods for the aid; and (2) to determine how the aid delivery impacted the overall satisfaction of the local population. To examine both concerns, two simulation models were developed, with one examining the throughput of aid delivered during the operation, and the other the satisfaction of the population based on the humanitarian aid effort.
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