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ID:
027216
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| Publication |
London, Wildwood House., 1974.
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| Description |
vii, 245p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
0704500965
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 013697 | 956.04/LAQ 013697 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
121164
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A thorough understanding of the Arab oil-embargo and production cuts of 1973/74 is obscured by attempts to determine its "success" or "failure" on the basis of a simplistic sender/target model. By contrast, this article analyzes the embargo as a communicative process and explores how both the embargoing and the embargoed countries constantly tried to define the contents, purpose, and legitimacy of the measures. Apart from its initially stated goal of pressuring the United States, Western Europe, and Japan to support the Arab countries in the conflict with Israel, various actors in the Arab as well as in the Western world used the embargo for a multitude of different purposes. Their largely symbolic interaction is not secondary for an understanding of the historical significance of the embargo, but the attempts to make use of the "oil-weapon" constituted its very meaning.
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| 3 |
ID:
126061
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| 4 |
ID:
126729
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 1967 war had more influence on the Arab-Israeli conflict than any other factor, and yet the Arab states did not make use of their most efficient weapon. Most of the research on the Six Day War which has touched on the oil embargo blames the embargo's failure on the lack of Arab unity rather than on the inability to set oil policies. Indeed, many researchers believe that the disagreements within the Arab world before the war prevented the oil-producing states from cooperating with their counterparts, such Egypt and Syria, that took part in the war against Israel, and that the embargo therefore did not stand a chance of succeeding. This article seeks to refute the received wisdom that the 1967 oil embargo was a failure because of the lack of Arab unity. By contrast, the success of the 1973 oil embargo was not, as is widely argued, due to Arab unity but to the nature of the oil market at the time.
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