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| 1 |
ID:
140025
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| Summary/Abstract |
American extended deterrence commitments span the globe. Despite extensive research on the causes of deterrence successes and failures, evidence of which US allies find what extended deterrence commitments credible is elusive. This article utilizes interviews with former Australian policy-makers to analyze the credibility of the United States to defend Australian forces during the 1999 INTERFET intervention in East Timor. While there was no direct threat to Australian sovereignty, the episode stoked concerns in Canberra regarding the willingness of Washington to come to Australia's assistance. The Howard government coveted a US tripwire force presence, and the Clinton administration's unwillingness to provide this raised serious concerns among Australian political elites about the alliance. While this says little about the separate question of whether Washington would use nuclear or conventional weapons in defense of Australian sovereignty, the Timor case indicates the existence of an extended deterrence credibility deficit regarding the more probable low-intensity conflicts that Australia finds itself in.
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| 2 |
ID:
121243
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 1918, Australia has joined the United States in every one of its major
conflicts: World War Two, Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Somalia,
Afghanistan, and Iraq. Australia's enduring commitment to the alliance has
led to a renewed focus on joint operations. The new maxim within Australian
defence circles is "interoperability." Interoperability with the US military
has become the keystone phrase for many issues relating to Australia's
procurement, strategy, and doctrine. Yet the other phrase used equally as
often is "self-reliance." Australian strategic planners simultaneously view the
US as an indispensable and unreliable ally. Although Australia has always
been at America's side, Australia was disappointed by the unenthusiastic
response of the US to the 1999 East Timor crisis. As such, the underlining
logic of interoperability is to hedge between dependence and self-reliance.
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