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| 1 |
ID:
128974
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The basic question this paper asks is how the domestic instability in China will affect external action.
China's society is undergoing a major change along with its economic growth, with various social
contradictions deepening, including gaps between the rich and the poor. These social contradictions
occasionally erupted in riots and demonstrations. Scholars have argued what sorts of external action
these developments would lead to, on which there are two camps of thought: (i) expansion, and (ii)
compromises. The problem is that for what reasons and through what mechanisms the domestic
instability would lead to external actions have not yet been fully clarified. Domestic instability does
not necessarily always influence external actions in all countries. There should be some conditions
in order for domestic instability to influence external actions. This paper argues that the intervening
variable that links domestic issues to external policy is the stability of the political system. From this
perspective, the current instability of China's political system is only limited and the likelihood that
domestic problems should be diverted to its external policy is not so high at the present stage. For
the moment at least, China is not in a situation where domestic instability would lead to hard-line
external policy, as suggested by diversionary theory. That is because the extent to which domestic
problems in China can make the political system itself unstable is limited. Meanwhile, regarding
the claim that China cannot compromise on external policy under the watchful eyes of the domestic
elite or society as a whole, as suggested by audience cost theory, there is both supporting and
negating evidence at present.
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| 2 |
ID:
121253
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper considers the process of constructing the official
discourse of weiwen (??, stability preservation) in the policing arena in
the first decade of the 21st century. It focuses on the pivotal period after
2003 when policing priorities were shifted from "striking hard" at serious
crime to pursuing weiwen to contain burgeoning protests and civil dissent,
as a move to maintain stability in the early to mid years of the Hu Jintao-
Wen Jiabao harmonious society era. We observe how Mao has been
central in this process. Stability preservation operations have been rationalised through Maoist ideology using some staples of Maoist discourse, particularly "social contradictions", and policing authorities have
adopted key methodological aspects of Maoist campaign-style policing to
embed this new weiwen focus in the everyday agendas of policing, while
ever more "mass incidents" disrupt the maintenance of stability in China.
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