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| 1 |
ID:
178760
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| Summary/Abstract |
Drawing on an original dataset of Chinese protests, this article documents an evolving relationship between state coercive capacity and overt repression across administrations. Specifically, it finds that under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao (2003–2012) protests in provinces with higher coercive capacity were less likely to meet with a crackdown, whereas the relationship between capacity and repression reversed during the first three years of Xi Jinping’s rule (2013–2015). Although the study demonstrates that the two periods were on average very different, change-point analysis reveals that the inflection point toward a harder line came already in the late Hu-Wen era. The Xi administration’s policies should therefore perhaps be understood more as a manifestation than a cause of shifts in the country’s social control.
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| 2 |
ID:
121258
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Can citizens in an authoritarian country like China influence
policy implementation? Two types of scholarship indicate ways that they
can: The first proposes that policy implementation is carried out through
a fragmented authoritarian system that requires consultation and cooperation among various government units, and this system is amenable to
pressure from outside groups. The second examines institutional channels designed to handle grievances and bridge communication between
citizens and the authorities. In this paper, I emphasize a link between
these two bodies of scholarship, showing how protest channels are connected to the fragmented authoritarian system and how the imperative to
maintain social stability leads higher-level authorities to resolve departmental conflicts in favour of protesters. I do this by examining a struggle
against the privatization of a hospital in North China, a case that illustrates how protesters successfully employed both the petition system and
the opportunities offered by the fragmented authoritarian system to
develop powerful alliances, to peacefully pressure top local authorities to
intervene and to overcome opposition in the local government, leading
to finalizing the municipalization of the hospital.
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