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EMISSION CAP (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   171416


Comparison between emission intensity and emission cap regulations / Hirose, Kosuke; Matsumura, Toshihiro   Journal Article
Hirose, Kosuke Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract We revisit command-and-control regulations and compare their efficiency, particularly an emission cap regulation that restricts total emissions and an emission intensity regulation that restricts emissions per unit of output under emission equivalence. We find that in both the most stringent target case, in which the target emissions level is close to zero, and the weakest target case, in which the target emissions level is close to business as usual, the emission intensity regulation yields greater welfare than does the emission cap regulation. However, in the moderate target cases, an emission cap regulation may be better in terms of welfare than an emission cap regulation because the emission intensity regulation causes over-production. Our results suggest that the efficiency of a policy measure depends on the target level of emissions.
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2
ID:   121340


Emission-dependent supply chain and environment-policy-making in the ‘cap-and-trade’ system / Shaofu Du; Zhu, Lili; Liang, Liang; Fang Ma   Journal Article
Shaofu Du Journal Article
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Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract The paper focuses on a so-called emission-dependent supply chain consisting of one single emission-dependent manufacturer and one single emission permit supplier in the 'cap-and-trade' system, where emission permit becomes requisite for production. We consider the emission cap of emission-dependent manufacturer allocated by the government as a kind of environmental policy and formally investigate its influence on decision-makings within the concerned emission-dependent supply chain as well as distribution fairness in social welfare. It is proved that the system-wide and the manufacturer's profits increase with the emission cap while the permit supplier's decreases. There is room for manufacturer and permit supplier to coordinate the supply chain to get more profit in a certain condition.
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