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| 1 |
ID:
123972
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the past decade the navy has changed dramatically. It has increased operations: decreased its number of ships; merged and created staffs and communities; responded to the 12 October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole-DDG-67 and 9/11; and deployed "Dirt Sailors" to fight inland battles in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the navy staff (OPNAV) has remained static, which one exception, the steady rise and fall of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Communication Networks Directorate or N6.
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| 2 |
ID:
050946
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| 3 |
ID:
063480
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| 4 |
ID:
063471
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| 5 |
ID:
063455
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| 6 |
ID:
148361
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| Summary/Abstract |
Modern warfare has shown us that actors who lack airpower can contend successfully with the American military.
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| 7 |
ID:
068266
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| 8 |
ID:
124766
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the arrival of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) amid the rapid arms race in South Asia. It analyzes the stability and instability prospects linked to the arrival of and dependence on TNWs. It states that TNW is a murky term that confronts a definitional issue. Although TNW has not been used yet, it entails the risk of its use on the battlefield in the event of a limited war. Conceptually, this sets the stage for an interesting debate on whether or not the arrival of TNWs is stabilizing for the South Asian region, which has confronted many wars and minor border skirmishes during pre- and post-nuclear periods. Since it is viewed that a possible limited military escalation to a nuclear level may not be ruled out and the arrival of TNWs has become a reality, the article concludes that a centralized command and control system bolstered with the non-deployed deterring posture of TNWs is the immediate solution to avert the related worries of pre-delegation, force protection, and the use-or-lose dilemma. It is expected that, learning from their nuclear predecessors, the South Asian nuclear leadership would practice restraint, remain rational, and call for the need of political trust and military reassurances to avert nuclear weapon use.
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| 9 |
ID:
124684
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When chief of army staff (COAS), General Bikram Singh took over as the head of the 13 lakh strong army on 31 May 2012, he was conscious of the extraordinary circumstances that had preceded his elevation. His predecessor, in his public fight with the government over his age row, had wittingly or unwittingly harmed the army grievously. The manpower, which is the real asset of any professional army, had been compelled to take sides: for or against the army chief, General V.K. Singh. Was their chief working for the army or simply for himself, was the question being discussed, in hushed voices, at all levels, from senior officers' enclaves, to formation and unit messes, junior commissioned officers (JCO) messes, and soldiers' langars. When the senior-most officer becomes suspect, the other officers could no longer remain above board.
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| 10 |
ID:
124125
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The marine corps is always looking for innovative ways to manipulate the battle space. One of the biggest challanges for marine communication is dealing with radio frequency(RF) spectrum. RF Spectrum is a commodity in finite supply.
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| 11 |
ID:
125356
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
As Hizbullah's fighting forces undergoes expansion, the number of its training facilities for urban operations is also increasing. Nicholas Blanford examines the group's use of these centres and the effect they are likely to have on its tactical capabilities.
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| 12 |
ID:
166592
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper explores the notion that US efforts to evade the political costs of war paradoxically contribute to the subsequent exacerbation of costs over time. Leaders seek to purchase political capital in the short term by limiting the costs and requirements of military operations, but in doing so cause strategic and political liabilities to mount in the long run. While identification of such behaviour is not new, insufficient attention has been devoted to explaining its causes, dynamics, and manifestations in relation to key decisions on and in war. Evidence derived from studies of recent American discretionary campaigns is analysed to advance an argument with respect to this pattern of self-defeating strategic behaviour.
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| 13 |
ID:
069139
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| 14 |
ID:
098085
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| 15 |
ID:
140949
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| Summary/Abstract |
While Western militaries recognise the logic and necessity of ‘irregular warfare’ in their military operations, the manifold aspects of irregular fighting have yet to be mastered fully. Information warfare, for example, appears to be a tool more capably employed by Russia, to the detriment of NATO. Rod Thornton explains how and why Russia has ‘won’ in Crimea by affording subversive information campaigns primacy in its military operations. Acknowledging the twofold constraints of international law and co-ordination that face Western governments seeking to play the same game, Thornton nonetheless expounds how the West might better pursue asymmetry in the security realm.
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| 16 |
ID:
137832
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| 17 |
ID:
118325
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Indian Army remains rooted in an outdated, British-inherited system that is struggling to cope with the combination of challenges posed by demands of modern warfare and a society that is undergoing a great churn. The greatest challenge has been to the famous officer-men relationship in the Indian armed forces. In the past decade, the armed forces have faced a new problem: increasing incidents of indiscipline, suicides and fratricide. Are these incidents happening because the traditional bond between officers and men, the bedrock on which the military functions, is fraying at the edges? Are there other external factors impinging upon the armed forces' functioning and eroding some of its admirable values? The article attempts to focus on these issues and provide some basic answers.
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| 18 |
ID:
123973
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Rear Admiral Erick A McValdon, US Navy, (Retired), senior advisor and director emeritus for Asia-Pacific Studies, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis-IFPA- Mr. Bosco and I are obviously not going to agree on whether China wants North Korea to have nuclear weapons. We do, nonetheless, both want Beijing to play an effective role in getting Pyongyang to relinquish its nuclear weapon programs. Many of us are conscientiously pursuing that including via a series of senior level Track 1.5 (government, thing tank, etc.) workshops organized by the US Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis over almost a decade.
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| 19 |
ID:
095737
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| 20 |
ID:
124765
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Protected by networks of hard and deeply buried facilities, North Korea's asymmetric warfare assets have emerged as a real threat to the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance. As a solution, the U.S.-ROK alliance has developed military technologies to defeat North Korea's hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs). However, questions remain regarding the efficiency of those technologies. By examining the contemporary status of North Korea's HDBTs and U.S. military technologies, this article proves that these newly developed military technologies are not very effective and that heavy reliance on technology is not a viable solution to North Korea's HDBTs.
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