Search Result

Srl

Item

ID: 121545

Breaking the trance: the perils of technological exuberance in the U.S. air force entering Vietnam / Fino, Steven A

Fino, Steven A	Journal Article
	0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)

Publication

2013.

Summary/Abstract

A survey of U.S. Air Force air-to-air armament from World War II through Vietnam's Operation ROLLING THUNDER reveals the institution's focus on developing advanced technologies and tactics designed to thwart hordes of Soviet bombers. Challenged by nimble MiGs over Vietnam, the service was reluctant to investigate "low-tech" armament solutions. When the value of a gun in air combat was finally acknowledged, the Air Force elected to field it as part of an integrated weapons system on the F-4E. In the interim, pilots at DaNang air base cobbled together an inelegant but effective air-to-air external gun system. The episode reveals the significant potential, and fragility, of unit-initiated tactical innovation and the peril that can arise when an organization's technological exuberance obfuscates less technologically-appealing solutions.

Key Words

United States ; Vietnam - History ; US Air Force ; Operation Rolling Thunder ; Soviet Bombers ; World War II

In Basket

Export

ID: 180457

Was Airpower “Misapplied” in the Vietnam War? reassessing Signaling in Operation Rolling Thunder / Gurantz, Ron

Gurantz, Ron	Journal Article
	0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)

Summary/Abstract

Operation Rolling Thunder’s failure has been widely blamed on the strategy of using force to send “signals.” It discredited the associated theory of coercion among a generation of military officers and scholars. In this paper I show that, whatever its other failures, Operation Rolling Thunder did successfully signal a threat. I rely on the latest research to demonstrate that Hanoi believed the bombing would eventually inflict massive destruction. I also show that Washington accurately ascribed the failure of the threat to North Vietnam’s resolve and continued the operation for reasons other than signaling. These findings show that Operation Rolling Thunder can be productively understood as an exercise in both signaling and countersignaling. Rather than discrediting the theory of coercion, these findings modify it. They show that failed threats can be informative and that coercive campaigns can become prolonged for reasons other than a lack of credibility.

Key Words

Vietnam War ; Airpower ; Operation Rolling Thunder

Links

'Full Text'

In Basket

Export