| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
141785
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The formal model of modern-system force employment developed in Stephen Biddle (2004) book, Military Power, is a standard text in the defense analysis field but has rarely been applied to analyze battlefield outcomes. The 2008 Five-Day War between Russia and the Republic of Georgia provides a compelling case study for empirical testing. The outcome of the conflict reveals an inconsistency between the theoretical model and the actual results, suggesting that technical and tactical force employment variables alone may not be sufficient to explain battlefield dynamics, and that the effects of psychological shock on unit morale and cohesion may constrain how well a military force can perform even while adhering to modern-system doctrine.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
121682
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
I
n the years since improvised explosive devices (IEDs) became symbols of asymmetric warfare and modern military conflict, very little has changed in the
realm of counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) strategy. The military
is always searching for better vehicles and equipment to defeat what is, at its core, a
homemade device made for a fraction of the cost of our technological countermeasures. As a result, C-IED strategy has primarily focused on developing new ways to
mitigate the effects of an IED blast rather than trying to prevent it from occurring.
Billions of dollars have been spent in the name of saving lives, yet the true cause
of the problem and its origins remain largely ignored, leaving out the crucial role
played by population-centric counterinsurgency operations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|