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ID: 149944

Affinity-to-commons model of public support for environmental energy policy / Merrill, Ryan; Sintov, Nicole

Merrill, Ryan	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

As atmospheric CO2 continues to rise above 450 PPM, policymakers struggle with uncertainty concerning predictors of citizen support for environmental energy policies (EEPs) and preferences for their design, topics which have received limited attention in empirical literature. We present an original model of policy support based on citizens’ affinity-to-commons: pathways by which individuals enjoy natural public goods that in turn shape preferences between alternative policy mechanisms. We evaluate this model using a survey of southern California electricity customers, with results indicating the model's utility in predicting public support of EEP. Stronger community ties are associated with preferences for “pull”-type subsidies, whereas stronger connections to natural commons are linked to support for both “pull” and “push”-type sanctions. Findings have implications for coalition building as advocates may engender support for green energy policy by framing sanctions as protecting natural commons, and framing subsidies either in this same way and/or as producing benefits for communities.

Key Words

Sanctions ; Subsidies ; Public Preferences ; Common Resources ; Connection to Nature

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ID: 121845

Mediation and conflict prevention / Eisenkopf, Gerald; Bachtiger, Andre

Bachtiger, Andre	Journal Article
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2013.

Summary/Abstract

Mediation is a popular process to prevent conflicts over common resources, but there is little clean insight into its effectiveness and mechanisms. Our experimental approach allows for a comprehensive analysis of third-party intervention into potential conflicts and circumvents key problems linked to the analysis of field data. A mediator who credibly threatens punishment in the case of uncooperative behavior achieves the efficient solution in most cases. Similar results are obtained even if the mediator is biased toward one party or has no incentive to intervene. When cooperation fails, communication without credible punishment threats leads to particularly low payouts for the "losing" party.

Key Words

Communication ; Mediation ; Experiment ; Common Resources

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