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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
121848
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article introduces the Continent of International Law (COIL) research project on international agreement design. COIL stems from the conviction that the International Organization subfield's focus on the couple hundred international organizations with physical headquarters had to be broadened to include the tens of thousands extant international agreements, that is, international law. Each piece of international law can and should be studied as an institution. Together, this set of institutions, which truly is a "continent," is theoretically very interesting and empirically very diversified. COIL's basic theoretical premise is that international agreement design and comparison across agreements begins by understanding the underlying cooperation problem(s) the agreements are trying to solve. COIL identifies 12 distinct and recurrent cooperation problems, which may occur alone or in combinations. The data collection features a random sample of international agreements conditional on the issue areas of economics, environment, human rights, and security. The first large-n, systematic operationalization of the cooperation problems underlying real international agreements is highlighted, and descriptive statistics are presented - some of which challenge conventional wisdom. For instance, enforcement problems (Prisoner's Dilemma-like situations) are important, but far from universal, with 30% of the agreements characterized by that underlying problem. The numerous and diverse COIL variables allow for a multi-dimensional operationalization of the difficult-to-measure concept of the "incomplete contract." Hypotheses from contract theory are tested, confirming the appropriateness of the new measure, the weakness of measures based on number of pages, and most significant, the rationality and efficiency of the continent of international law.
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| 2 |
ID:
182739
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper provides a framework for analyzing the interactions among legal environments, incomplete contracts and specialized investments. It is well known that providers of specialized investments may be taken advantage when the contract is incomplete, thus an improvement in legal environments may be able to better protect those specialized asset investors and provide them with stronger incentive for specialized investments hence promote the overall level of specialization of the economy and enhance labor productivity. (1) We use the data set from IEDB(Industrial Enterprises Data Bank) of China to capture this effect. It is found that legal environment improvement does enhance the labor productivity through encouragement of specialization. This effect is robust under different settings in assumptions of endogeneity, heterogeneity and measurements of productivity index. (2) Heterogeneity analysis shows that a bigger market scale does encourage deeper specialization, more specialized investments, and thus improving the labor productivity. (3) The above conclusion holds up not only at the micro (firm) level but also at the macro level of the economy. The labor productivity increase happens with the growth of an industry along with deeper specialization and better legal environments.
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