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| 1 |
ID:
116427
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Abstract The Republic of Fiji experienced three armed coups in less than twenty years - 1987, 2000, and again in 2006 - symptoms of inter-communal tensions in the country and a political, economic and social system unable to manage them. The Commonwealth, through the good offices of its Secretary-General, was the lead international actor in responding to the crisis that followed the 2000 coup. The following study provides an overview of the Commonwealth as an institution, with a focus on its conflict prevention capacity, through the lens of its actions in Fiji at the time. It seeks to identify the nature and impact of Commonwealth engagement, highlighting potentially useful lessons regarding the institution, the individuals who acted on its behalf, and the efficacy of their actions.
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| 2 |
ID:
116425
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Abstract This article examines the efforts of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to manage tensions in Ukraine between the substantial Russian minority and the Ukrainian government, and to prevent potentially violent conflict in Crimea from 1994 to 2001, as well as the subsequent efforts to promote peace and stability. It questions why the HCNM was remarkably successful in crisis management from 1994 to 2001, especially in averting secessionism in Crimea, but was hampered in his efforts to achieve a solid foundation for durable peace through the creation of a robust system of minority rights protection. The central argument is that regional politics often preclude the construction of a minority rights regime that could otherwise provide the foundation for durable peace.
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| 3 |
ID:
116424
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Abstract Conflict prevention is enjoying a renaissance in international policy circles. However, the official machinery of the international community presently offers few institutions with a specific mandate to address the causes of political violence at an early stage. One such multilateral mechanism dedicated solely to the prevention of conflict is the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Over two decades, the office has developed a significant track record of effectiveness against which to examine the preventive efforts of other intergovernmental organizations. In this article, we examine the prevention efforts of the HCNM in Georgia, Macedonia, and Ukraine and compare these with the preventive diplomacy of three other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs): the Organization of American States (OAS) in Guyana, the Commonwealth in Fiji, and the UN in Afghanistan, Burundi, and Macedonia. Our findings offer some useful and surprising insights into effective prevention practice, with implications for how IGOs might improve preventive diplomacy in the future.
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| 4 |
ID:
116426
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Abstract The South American country of Guyana has a history of turmoil and violence around its presidential elections. The 2006 elections, however, were cited as largely free of violence and post-election unrest. While the peaceful outcome may be attributed to a number of factors, the involvement of the Organization of American States in setting up an electoral observation mission and in engaging in preventive diplomacy played a constructive role in the process, in addition to other ongoing initiatives. This article examines the OAS' use of its mandate for the preservation of democracy as an entry point for conflict prevention. In particular, it analyzes the role of election monitoring and the facilitation of dialogue as a form of preventive diplomacy. The article argues that the Guyana case provides an example of the OAS using its democracy promotion mandate to prevent conflict, specifically election-related violence. It also highlights some of the critiques of OAS work in the area of democracy promotion and election monitoring, noting that the organization has engaged in these activities only in selective cases that meet specific criteria.
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| 5 |
ID:
116428
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2012.
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Abstract The United Nations represented an organization of severely limited means during the Cold War. The Secretary-General's office became one of the few instruments in the UN system with the power to influence international relations, albeit in limited ways. As Afghanistan emerged from one war in 1989, it risked falling into another involving the various Afghan stakeholders left to fight each other in the wake of their victory over the Soviets. The office of the Special Representative to the Secretary-General emerged as a key exponent of "quiet diplomacy," as various emissaries shuttled across the globe working to prevent this fragile post-conflict state's return to violent conflict. The operating environment was saturated with mistrust as a result of superpower tensions, regional agendas, ethno-religious differences, and a highly militarized landscape. This article considers the geopolitical, institutional, operational, and personal dimensions of this diplomatic campaign from the time of Soviet withdrawal until 1992. Ultimately, the campaign's limitations overwhelmed its advantages and the Afghan state dissolved into a dark period of warlordism and violence. This article explores the reasons for the eventual failure of diplomacy and its implications for quiet diplomatic efforts that have resurfaced in Afghanistan since 2001.
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