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| 1 |
ID:
129107
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel spoke about U.S. nuclear forces at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in early January, he emphasized two key points. First, he declared that the United States was "going to invest in the modernization we need to invest in to keep that deterrent stronger than it's ever been." He then added that "we're going to continue to require every element of our nuclear deterrent in the triad."[1] His audience at the Wyoming base might have heard a welcome, if unexceptional, commitment to the future of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, but there could have been more to the secretary's comments. In this period of fiscal constraints and declining defense budgets, many in in the wider policy community are voicing doubts about the ability of the United not only to maintain all three legs of the nuclear triad, but also to replace each leg with new missiles, bombers, and submarines. Although the current debate over the future composition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal often is framed in fiscal terms, it is more about the future need for and role of nuclear weapons than it is about how much money the U.S. government is going to spend on them. Critics of the current plans to modernize the U.S. nuclear force structure argue that the investments are excessive because nuclear weapons are less relevant to U.S. national security in the 21st century than they were in the past. Supporters argue that this investment is necessary because nuclear weapons continue to play a critical role in U.S. national security. Regardless, if defense budgets continue to decline in the coming decades, the country may face difficult and possibly illogical trade-offs as it pays for the rising cost of nuclear modernization. The United States deploys strategic nuclear warheads on three types of delivery vehicles: long-range, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range heavy bombers based in the United States. Each of the delivery systems in the U.S. nuclear force is aging, and all could reach the end of their service lives in the next 30 years. The warheads that these systems would deliver also are more than 25 years old and contain aging components that may raise questions about their reliability in the future
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| 2 |
ID:
124526
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In a general and economical view, this article analyzes methods and mechanisms for the pooling and sharing of military forces and weapons inside the European Union (EU) in times of scarcity. Pooling and sharing could improve the EU military capabilities significantly if differences in location factors were taken into account and all states would focus on their respective strengths. More competition and less concentration are the keys to ensuring guaranteed access to military assets. Pooling and sharing are likely to be successful only if large states enhance their emphasis on collective defense by mutual aid and self-help, and reduce particularistic and parochial interests of local gain. The realm of personnel has the most potential for improvement but any change is likely to generate policy implications.
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| 3 |
ID:
130070
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Far-reaching consequences from declining Defense budgets will take years to overcome. Given a scenario in which U.S. capabilities have waned against the march of new threats, what should be done to mitigate the risks associated with a smaller force? What parts of current military framework should be preserved or reinforced to retain our warfighting potency? Emboldened with an economic system that rewards ingenuity, Americans look to technology to solve problems. The inclination to reach first for hardware solutions certainly has merit. The tools and networks of commerce that have emerged since our founding have altered the socioeconomic landscape and fueled an insatiable appetite for material goods. But narrow-minded materialistic thinking can foreclose opportunities and even impair national security.
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| 4 |
ID:
121966
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