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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
189265
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| Summary/Abstract |
For the past decade, a cruel and bloody civil war has wracked Syria. The conflict, and especially its military and humanitarian aspects, has been surveyed extensively. But like every war, that in Syria involves a ‘soft conflict’ in addition to the military confrontation. By this is meant the religious, educational, social, and cultural actions undertaken by the Shi’ite axis – the Syrian regime and its allies, Iran and Hezbollah – vis-à-vis the Sunni majority in the country. For Bashar Assad, a member of the Alawite sect, and his Shi’ite allies, the Sunnis pose a real threat, which can best be countered by converting them to Shi’ism.
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| 2 |
ID:
192257
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| Summary/Abstract |
The present study examines relations between Iran and the United States as reflected in the historic athletic encounter between the two in the 1998 World Cup games. It describes how each party viewed the game and the opportunities it offered: did it indeed offer a chance at thawing the relations between Tehran and Washington, as the Americans thought? Or did the match serve as an arena of ‘mimic warfare’, as it was perceived by many Iranians, who saw in it an opportunity to avenge themselves on America and demonstrate their superiority? The second part of the article will discuss the effect which the football match of 1998, and even more so that of 2000, had on the Iranian American community in the United States. It will also examine American attempts to leverage these two encounters to create more athletic meets between the two countries. We begin with a background survey of relations between the two countries.
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| 3 |
ID:
122049
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article follows the last 72 hours of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War; that is, the three days from the collapse of the first ceasefire, on 23 October, until 25 October, when the United Nations Security Council Resolution 340, which ended the war, was adopted. The goal is to present and analyse the interests of the United States and how it managed its policy vis-à-vis Israel and Egypt during the ceasefire imbroglio. However, the article devotes special attention to the serious crisis with the Soviet Union that played out during those fateful hours. It stemmed from the note sent by the leader of the Soviet Union, Leonid I. Brezhnev, to US President Richard M. Nixon on 24 October. From the contents of the message, senior American decision-makers concluded that the Soviets were planning the unilateral deployment of an armed force to the Middle East. In response to this threat, these officials decided to raise the state of alert of the American armed forces to Level 3. The main conclusion of the research, however, is that no real Soviet threat existed. On the contrary, the Soviet Union was interested in preserving détente and in continuing to cooperate with the United States in order to put an end to the violence in the Middle East.
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