| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
122162
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| 2 |
ID:
122341
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| 3 |
ID:
128924
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| 4 |
ID:
125930
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the sun sets in this Line of Control (LC) village of Dehri Dabsi in Balakote area of Mendhar, the deafening sound of mortar shells rattles the air. Nobody is startled for, this has become the routine here for past one month. Life is on an edge here for the people, caught between the LC fence, minefields and night-long bombings.
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| 5 |
ID:
178398
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| Summary/Abstract |
In Kashmir, the worst fallout from the current state of India and Pakistan’s confrontations at the Line of Control (LoC) is the total disregard for the 2003 ceasefire agreement. While political parties, governments and armed forces on both sides of the conflict are key actors in the current dynamics, also stationed on the LoC are military observers as part of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), first instituted in 1949. While India is opposed to the presence of the UN military observers, little is known about the perceptions of the group’s role and its potential capacity to play a constructive role in keeping peace along the border. This research project is an endeavour to gain this understanding based on the views of selected elites and opinion makers in India and Pakistan. The data points to challenges to UNMOGIP’s mandate following the Simla Agreement of 1972 and the change in the status of the ceasefire line to the LoC. Compounded further by the severity of the conflict between India and Pakistan, New Delhi’s opposition to UNMOGIP’s mandate further weakened its operational capacity to effectively monitor and report ceasefire violations.
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