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Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
122595
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
This article critically evaluates the basis, aspirations, and prospects for bilateral security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. The assumption that common enemies, friends, and interests should have given rise to solid and steadily improving relations between Tokyo and Seoul has been far from realized. Rather, the Japan-ROK relationship continues to be marked by highly volatile behavior - ranging from intense friction to reluctant cooperation - which not only offers a vexing puzzle to the Realist school of international relations but also to the Constructivist one. This article argues that despite the perceived improvement in relations, Japan-South Korea security cooperation is situational and limited; recent developments do not imply a fundamental realignment of the two powers towards one another.
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2 |
ID:
172233
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Summary/Abstract |
Does Australia have a ‘strategic policy’? Australia’s debate has seen an inflation of the use of the term ‘strategic policy’, often used synonymously with ‘defence policy’ and ‘strategic guidance’ to indicate a major policy or to simply describe Australia’s strategic environment. However, far from pure semantics, the term ‘strategic policy’ has become dissociated from the specific understanding of the policy objectives attached to the use and the threat of the use of military force. Instead, contemporary usage of ‘strategic policy’ has come to reflect what Everett Carl Dolman called a ‘favourable continuation of events’, reducing strategy to a mere functional adjective. Moreover, a focus on ‘policy’ as meeting the objectives of a state, as opposed to ‘politik’, which encompasses policy, politics and the polity, has led to the restriction on choices and objectives for Canberra. In an increasingly contested Asia, the Australian debate should avoid the obfuscation that comes with a term such as ‘strategic policy’ as this can have negative implications for Australian force structure and planning. More broadly, the application of the term ‘strategic policy’ reflects the challenge of Australia as a medium-sized power developing an independent strategy in the context of its history, geography, politics and society.
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3 |
ID:
187969
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Summary/Abstract |
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led European powers, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) all to realize that significant steps were needed to redress the European security order. They responded to the invasion by imposing major economic sanctions against Moscow, delivering arms and other assistance to Kyiv, and revitalizing NATO. As NATO’s new Strategic Concept of June 2022 noted, the Euro-Atlantic area is now defined by “strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks.”1 Importantly, it termed the Russian Federation a “direct threat” to allies’ security, the first such usage since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, Russia’s actions have raised concerns in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the United States that China will also ramp up its political as well as economic pressure and military aggression to unify its claimed territories.2
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4 |
ID:
122178
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
Australia has long been a key ally of the United States in the Asia-Pacific, and it has welcomed US announcements of a 'pivot' towards the region in the face of a rising China. Canberra will lend political support, provide US forces with greater strategic depth, and offer selective military contributions, particularly in the eastern Indian Ocean and the Malacca and Lombok Straits. However, Benjamin Schreer and Sheryn Lee argue that, barring a dramatic change in the strategic environment, Australia will retain its focus on the immediate neighbourhood and will remain sceptical of attempts to construct an anti-Chinese coalition.
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