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ID:
113130
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
WHEN U.S. lawmakers returned to Washington in December 1849 for the Thirty-First Congress, they knew they faced a raucous session. As Washington's Democratic newspaper, the Daily Union, editorialized, "A crisis in our affairs is rapidly approaching, and great events are near at hand." But the members could not foresee the magnitude of legislative dysfunction. The crisis emerged when the House couldn't muster a majority to elect a Speaker. Without a Speaker, the chamber couldn't organize, and committees couldn't meet. Without a functioning House, the Senate couldn't do business either. President Zachary Taylor couldn't send up his annual message and set a national agenda. Congress couldn't appropriate money. The government froze.
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| 2 |
ID:
113135
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| 3 |
ID:
113133
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
EUROPE'S DEBT crisis is threatening a political order that has been built up over the course of more than a half century. It is still entirely possible-indeed likely-that the European single currency will not survive the crisis. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, has predicted that if the euro collapses, the European Union will crumble with it. The destruction of the EU would, in turn, remove the organization around which postwar European politics has been constructed.
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| 4 |
ID:
113131
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2012.
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WHEN GREAT powers begin to experience erosion in their global standing, their leaders inevitably strike a pose of denial. At the dawn of the twentieth century, as British leaders dimly discerned such an erosion in their country's global dominance, the great diplomat Lord Salisbury issued a gloomy rumination that captured at once both the inevitability of decline and the denial of it. "Whatever happens will be for the worse," he declared. "Therefore it is our interest that as little should happen as possible." Of course, one element of decline was the country's diminishing ability to influence how much or how little actually happened.
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| 5 |
ID:
113136
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| 6 |
ID:
113132
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
IN OUR common narrative, the modern era of global finance-what we call the Old Order-begins with the Great Depression and New Deal of the 1930s. The economic model put in place by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and others at the end of World War II is seen as a political as well as economic break point. But arbitrarily selected demarcation points in any human timeline can be misleading. The purpose of narrative, after all, is to simplify the complex and, over time, to remake the past in today's terms. As we approach any discussion of the Old Order, we must acknowledge that the image of intelligent design in public policy is largely an illusion.
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| 7 |
ID:
113134
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| 8 |
ID:
113129
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
THIS SPECIAL issue of The National Interest is particularly timely because we are living in a world that we know and that has shaped our thinking, but that world is in a process of transformation. We are struggling with institutions and practices of an Old World when that Old World is fading. This issue explores this global transformation, and I commend to you the articles contained here under the rubric of the "Crisis of the Old Order."
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