| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scholars tend to pessimistically argue that the weaker a regime is the harder it becomes for international actors to coerce it to fight the terrorist groups that it harbors/sponsors, since weak regimes are afraid that taking such an unpopular step could critically undermine their stability. Yet, this argument ignores the policy option that the coercing actor has of threatening to take steps which would undermine the stability of the weak regime unless it ceases its support for terrorist groups. Such a regime-threatening coercive strategy can overcome the problem of the weak regime's lack of political incentives because if the threat is credible, even a weak regime may conclude that it is politically cheaper to suppress the terrorists than face an externally triggered regime destabilization. Since weak regimes often care more about their survival than about national security interests, the regime-threatening coercive strategy has the best chances for success against such regimes. This article presents three different regime-threatening military coercive strategies and explores the conditions under which they are likely to be successful.
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