| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
122304
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
International advocacy campaigns allow the concerns of disadvantaged groups in developing countries to reach policymakers. However, recent research has challenged the motivations of the Northern nongovernmental organizations involved and raised concerns about the impacts of North-South NGO partnerships on Southern NGO control. This article addresses these concerns by developing a typology of NGOs based on their financial incentives and the rigidity with which they adhere to their established organizational mission. It then models interactions between NGOs of different types as a strategic game. In the game, NGOs decide whether to enter international campaigns and, if so, manage campaign function to maximize payoff. "Participation-oriented" Northern NGOs, whose supporters reward them for undertaking advocacy, were found to run lengthy but ineffective campaigns and focus on publicity. "Outcome-oriented" groups, whose supporters reward them for measurable achievement, were found to generate higher campaign intensity but exit after either early victories or costly difficulties. The model is illustrated with a comparative analysis of two different campaigns regarding the Narmada Dam project.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
151247
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Proposed solutions to INGO accountability problems frequently conflict. Dominant scholarship focuses on promoting self-regulation within the INGO community, while an alternative body of literature focuses on generating external incentives for accountability, using state/IO regulations or conditional funding. This article analyzes the causes and implications of this disjuncture. We first show that self-reform requires a high degree of INGO autonomy, whereas external reform requires a high degree of donor control. We next conceptualize INGO autonomy as a price funders pay for INGO services. Using this framework, we show that INGO self-reform implicitly assumes that the demand for INGO services outstrips the supply (scarce supply), forcing funders to pay a high price in terms of INGO autonomy. Proposals for external incentives assume the opposite (abundant supply), such that competition among INGOs effects a downward pressure on autonomy, increasing donor control. These findings reveal that solutions to NGO accountability cannot be an “all of the above” proposition. Moreover, because demand for services may vary between sectors of NGO activity, effective solutions need to be sector-specific, rather than universal.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|