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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
122397
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
I
n the spring of 1763 Great Britain, basking in the warm afterglow of decisive
victory in the Seven Years War, presided over a vast and unprecedented
global empire. The small island nation seemingly, and rather suddenly, found
itself without peer-enjoying a level of military and political hegemony not
seen since the days of the Roman Empire.2
It was a unique, albeit fleeting,
position. In the span of a mere twenty years, the world's preeminent global
power, despite enjoying a considerable advantage in almost every conceivable category used to calculate military potential, found itself disgraced and
defeated by a start-up nation possessing a markedly inferior conventional military capability. Crippled by a grossly burgeoning national debt, diplomatically
isolated, and politically divided at home, the North Ministry became embroiled
in a protracted and unpopular global war that its policymakers and military
leaders seemed incapable of understanding-much less winning-until it was
far too late.3
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| 2 |
ID:
140930
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the use of combined army-navy operations and the development of Union military strategy during the first year of the war. It argues that the army and the navy, despite differences in service culture, a paucity of joint doctrine, and the absence of a “formal” general staff system were, in fact, working together to design and implement an overall strategic concept during the crucial opening months of the conflict. Despite several early examples of impressive inter-service cooperation, however, the greater use of combined army-navy operations eventually succumbed to the confluence of personality, military paradigm, and strategic choice.
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