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ID:
139998
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| Summary/Abstract |
Using Social Network Analysis, this article illuminates the relationship between the Islamists and rebels involved in the Malian conflict. We use publicly available data to demonstrate that the connection between Islamists and rebels depends on brokers who defected from the Tuareg rebellion to radical groups. Our work also details the internal relationships within each of the subgroups. By using descriptive network analysis, we are able to show that both groups were affected by the accidental disappearance of one of the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb emirs, and the death of one of the architects of the Tuareg rebellion. Both events affected social cohesion. The article concludes with a discussion of the influence that the French-backed intervention may have on the evolution of the conflict, and how network analysis could contribute to a better understanding of terrorist activities in the region.
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| 2 |
ID:
132100
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was set up in northern Mali years before the Tuareg rebellion of 2012. A safe haven for its members, this sanctuary allowed the group to raise funds through drug-trafficking and the ransom business. In 2012, AQIM and its local allies took control of northern Mali and attempted to create an Islamic state - an effort which was cut short by the French military intervention in January 2013. Laurent de Castelli dissects the motives which led AQIM to create its sanctuary in northern Mali before 2012, its drive to establish an Islamic state with the support of its allies, and the reasons behind this evolution
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| 3 |
ID:
122423
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Mali has been faced with a series of uprisings by its Tuareg over a number of years. Although each of these rebellions was ended by a cease-fire, the Malian government never succeeded in instituting longer term peace agreements. The 2012 Tuareg rebellion has presented even more significant security threats. The environment in northern Mali now is marked by multiple armed groups, with multiple competing agendas. This complex situation, with Tuareg rebels, Islamists with varying goals, and local militias, with a pattern of varying levels of cooperation and conflict, will at best be very difficult to resolve in the long term. Combined with an almost complete security vacuum in northern Mali on the part of the government, this situation could be intractable even with external intervention. At the same time, the focus on counterterrorism in northern Mali may not be conducive to a long-term resolution of what in reality is a much more complicated security environment.
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