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| 1 |
ID:
019593
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| Publication |
2001.
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| Description |
599-612
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| 2 |
ID:
023416
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| Publication |
Jan 8, 2003.
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| Description |
22-27
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| 3 |
ID:
172569
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| Summary/Abstract |
Current dynamics in UCAV proliferation in the Middle East signal that combat drones have become key strategic enablers for state actors in the region, and are no longer seen as an optional asset. With the development of a multitude of indigenous UCAV projects, and the arrival of Chinese-made armed drones on the international market, military procurement in the Middle East has entered a new phase, in which possessing armed drone capabilities is becoming the norm. This article examines the operational and strategic considerations driving Middle Eastern states’ UCAV procurement policies, analysing those countries who have been focusing on armed drones for combat purposes and additional intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) needs. The main drivers behind this trend are the operational and strategic advantages brought about by UCAVs, where the benefits related to cost, reliability, and operational risk mitigation are matched by the increased ability to project power that the platform allows, either through deniability or by making UCAVs available to proxies and allies.
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| 4 |
ID:
138583
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| Summary/Abstract |
High operational reliability is an essential prerequisite for UAVs. A good engine is the most difficult aspect in the designing of a UAV. Designers have to make sure that the engine can support the airframe and the UAV has a low signature through low vibration. It should be able to support long-endurance missions over the target. Another area of operational reliability for a UAV comes from its airframe, which should be able to support the mission in all types of conditions, especially rough weather. There is a flipside to the development of the drones globally. A recent report by the Rand Corporation warned that, in the future, terrorist groups might be able to buy small, armed drones, “Smaller systems could become the next IEDs – low-cost, low-tech weapons that are only of limited lethality individually but can cause considerable attrition when used in large numbers over time.”
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| 5 |
ID:
166255
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| 6 |
ID:
140269
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| Summary/Abstract |
The expansive use of armed unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV), or ‘drones’, by the United States over the past decade has occurred within a particular strategic context characterized by irregular warfare operations in permissive environments. Ongoing strategic, ethical and moral debates regarding specific uses of drones may well be overtaken by a new generation of armed combat drones able to survive and operate in contested airspace with design elements such as stealth and greater levels of machine autonomy. These design parameters, and the likely strategic context within which second generation UCAVs will be deployed, suggest a fundamentally different set of missions from those performed by the current generation of drones. The most beneficial characteristic of current unmanned systems has been the ability to combine persistent surveillance with the delivery of small precision-guided munitions. With a shift to more contested environments, this type of armed surveillance mission may become less practical and second generation UCAVs will instead focus on high intensity warfare operations. These new systems may have significant implications for deterrence, force doctrine and the conduct of warfare.
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| 7 |
ID:
119338
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| 8 |
ID:
147176
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| 9 |
ID:
056060
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| 10 |
ID:
075877
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| 11 |
ID:
019196
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| Publication |
May 2001.
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| Description |
55-59
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| 12 |
ID:
138660
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