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ID:
151272
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent years, international third parties have increasingly sought to manage the dire consequences of civil war, often by deploying peacekeeping operations. However, peacekeepers sometimes face deliberate attacks by armed groups. These attacks hamper efforts to provide humanitarian relief and security. This raises a critical question: what factors lead rebel groups to target peacekeepers? We argue that internal conflict dynamics are important for explaining this phenomenon. Rebels attack peacekeepers as an alternative strategy to undermine incumbent regimes. They adopt this strategy as the balance of power turns against them in their struggle against governments. We evaluate our argument using a novel event data set on violent attacks on peacekeepers in sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2009. We find a positive relationship between rebel losses and violent attacks on peacekeepers. These findings hold when controlling for mission-specific characteristics, time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, and across different model specifications.
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| 2 |
ID:
122594
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Militias are responsible for some of the most egregious human rights abuses in civil wars. This said, they vary tremendously, and some may serve as a source of security against abusive rebel groups. What distinguishes predatory anti-rebel militias from those which are more or less popular? While previous studies focus on the relationship between militias and states, this study demands equal attention to the militia/rebel relationship. While militias in East Timor were largely predatory, formed at the behest of state forces to attack rebel supporters, militias in Aceh were more diverse, and some formed among ethnic minorities against rebel attacks. This article proposes that militias created where the state dominates are likely to be predatory, while those resisting powerful rebels are more likely to be defensive, popular organizations.
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