|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
122592
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Nixon and Ford administrations celebrated the 1973 Chilean coup and did everything they could to help the dictatorship that followed. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in particular, supported General Augusto Pinochet's regime and turned a blind eye to its human rights abuses. But how did the Chilean dictatorship view the United States and how did the relationship play out in practice? Drawing on Chilean and U.S. documents, this article argues that in spite of Kissinger's efforts, bilateral relations were actually rather tense. Not only did the Chilean dictatorship continually request more than the Ford administration could offer but Santiago's military leaders also had different conceptions of the Cold War and how to fight it. This, in turn, sheds light on the problems U.S. policy makers faced when dealing with anti-communist Third World allies. It also points to the fragmentation of the global Cold War struggle in the mid-1970s.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
122591
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Nine days after the victory in the Six Day War the Israeli cabinet adopted a resolution which seemingly offered Egypt and Syria the territories they had just lost in exchange for contractual peace. In public and academic discourse the resolution has been presented as a 'generous peace offer' which was transmitted to Cairo and Damascus through the United States and was immediately rejected. The article demonstrates that the 'generous peace offer' was never offered to the Arabs. The cabinet resolution was mainly a diplomatic manoeuver whose aim was to gain American political support against a Soviet move at the United Nations for immediate and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in the war. The article argues that Abba Eban, Israel's foreign minister at the time, created the myth of the 'generous peace offer' and that it has been turned into an accepted wisdom by dozens of writers and scholars who have recycled Eban's story unchallenged.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
122590
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In the early years of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the Departments of State and Defense battled over the decision to use chemical herbicides to defoliate the landscape and destroy enemy access crops. While the Pentagon won the initial battle, allowing herbicidal warfare to proceed, State's concerns about program ultimately proved prophetic as the chemical war waged by the United States in Southeast Asia further alienated the Vietnamese villagers the program was ostensibly designed to protect. This essay moves beyond previous studies of Operation Ranch Hand by exploring the politics of the herbicidal warfare, and crop destruction in particular, from Washington D.C. to MACV to Vietnamese villages. Drawing on previously unexplored archival sources, this essay explores contemporary reactions to the herbicide program and shows how the chemical war embodied the larger contradictions of the American war in Vietnam.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
122593
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In 1976 Syria intervened militarily in the Lebanese Civil War in support of the Lebanese Right and against its traditional allies, the Leftist-Palestinian alliance. Scholars have debated what role the United States, and particularly President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, played in Syria's actions. Some scholars argue the U.S. government lured Syria into Lebanon; others argue the Syrian intervention was proposed by Syrian President Hafez al-Asad to the United States. Recently declassified documents support the latter, and demonstrate that the U.S. government initially opposed Syria's proposal for fear that it would trigger a war with Israel. The Ford administration ultimately supported the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, however, because it sought to marginalize the PLO and the militias of Leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt, which challenged America's perceived Cold War interests. This approach accomplished short-term U.S. policy goals, but it did not tend toward solving the region's long-term problems.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
122589
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Petroleum Pitfalls" examines the U.S. response to the 1963 Argentine oil crisis. Newly elected Argentine President Arturo Illia cancelled oil exploration and drilling contracts held by private, predominately U.S. corporations, by executive decree on 16 November 1963. Kennedy administration officials had worked with oil executives in an unsuccessful attempt to convince Illia not to issue the decree. In Argentina, the oil crisis both emerged from and enflamed economic nationalism. In the United States it helped dampen political support for foreign aid generally, and prompted strict modifications to the Hickenlooper amendment specifically. In the end, the crisis poisoned the U.S.-Argentine relationship. Foreshadowing the Mann Doctrine, Ambassador Robert McClintock advocated enhancing support for Argentine military officers whose aims were thought to align with U.S. political and economic objectives. In a larger sense, official U.S. promotion of oil interests in Argentina demonstrates significant continuities in U.S. policy between the first decades of the twentieth century and the Cold War era.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|