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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW VOL: 65 NO 3 (7) answer(s).
 
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ID:   122547


Aegis BMD global enterprise: a high end maritime partnership / Hicks, Brad; Galdorisi, George; Truver, Scott C   Journal Article
Truver, Scott C Journal Article
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Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract For more than three decades, beginning soon after the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union faced off against each other. The concept of "mutual assured destruction"-MAD, the U.S. threat of massive retaliation to a Soviet first strike-became America's Cold War de facto strategic defense policy. In March 1983, however, President Ronald Reagan asked whether ballistic missiles could be destroyed before they reached the United States or its allies, thus catalyzing efforts for a national ballistic-missile-defense program that would undermine the need for MAD. That same year, the U.S. N avy commissioned USS Ticonderoga (CG 47), the first of what is to become a fleet of more than eighty Aegis warships. In 2012, these trends have converged, and Aegis ballistic-missile defense (BMD) is an increasingly important component of a robust national BMD System (BMDS).
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2
ID:   122551


China's aerospace power trajectory in the near seas / Kostecka, Daniel J   Journal Article
Kostecka, Daniel J Journal Article
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Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract Air and aerospace power has been fundamental for defending China's "near seas"-encompassing the Bohai Gulf, the Yellow Sea, and the East and South China Seas-since the founding of the People's Republic.1 While air and naval operations did not play a significant role in the Chinese Civil War, which was won by the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the victorious Communist forces were threatened immediately by hostile air and naval forces from the maritime sphere. In 1949 the regime was ill equipped to defend its eleven thousand miles of coastline and more than six thousand islands against attacks and harassment from Nationalist Chinese air and naval forces occupying the large islands of Taiwan and Hainan, as well as several smaller islands, let alone protect the People's Republic of China (PRC) against the aircraft carriers of the powerful U.S. Seventh Fleet. Even before the People's Republic was officially declared in October 1949, communist leaders immediately recognized the need for strong naval and air forces; the PLA's commander, General Zhu De, stated in April 1949 that China "must build its own air forces and navy in order to boost national defense."2
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3
ID:   122548


Learning from Lebanon: airpower and strategy in Israel's 2006 war against Hezbollah / Lambeth, Benjamin S   Journal Article
Lambeth, Benjamin S Journal Article
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Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract From 12 July until 15 August 2006, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) waged a thirty-four-day war against the Iranian terrorist proxy organization Hezbollah in response to a well-planned raid by a team of Hezbollah combatants from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. That raid resulted in the abduction of two IDF soldiers, who had then been taken back into Lebanon for use as hostages.1 Code-named Operation CHANGE OF DIRECTION, the greatly escalated counteroffensive that the raid prompted has since been widely regarded as the IDF's most inconclusive combat performance in Israel's history. Waged under the direction of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and his minister of defense at the time, Amir Peretz, the campaign was dominated by precision standoff attacks by the Israel Air Force (IAF) and by IDF artillery and battlefield rockets, with no significant commitment of conventional ground troops until the last days of fighting before a cease-fire went into effect.
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4
ID:   122545


Naval operations: a close look at the operational level of war at sea / Hughes, Wayne P   Journal Article
Hughes, Wayne P Journal Article
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Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract Today's American navy writes prolifically about maritime strategies but has not devoted equal attention to campaign plans or analysis that tests the strategies' viability. We illustrate herein how the operational-or campaign-level links policy and strategy to the tactical and technological elements of war at sea. First, we relate how the U.S. Navy reluctantly came to accept the existence of an operational level of warfare but having done so will find it useful. Second, we describe important properties of naval operations in terms of constants, trends, and variables in warfare at and from the sea. Third, we demonstrate how operationallevel planning would help if the Navy and the nation were to adopt six clearly stated, twenty-first-century strategies that would serve present and future national policies better than do current strategy documents.
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5
ID:   122552


Navy's moral compass: commanding officers and personal misconduct / Light, Mark F   Journal Article
Light, Mark F Journal Article
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Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract The U.S. Navy has an integrity problem in the ranks of its commanding officers (COs). Consider these headlines: "Cruiser CO Relieved for 'Cruelty.'"1 "CO Fired, Charged with Solicitation."2 "CO of Attack Sub Fired for 'Drunkenness.'"3 These are just a few cases in a recent deluge of early reliefs of "skippers." In 2010, twenty-three Navy COs were relieved of command and "detached for cause," an enormous increase over previous years. The trend continues: twentyone commanding officers were fired in 2011 as of the end of October.4 Even more worrisome is the fact that a large and increasing percentage of those dismissals are due to personal misconduct, such as sexual harassment, drunkenness, and fraternization. Although (as far as we can tell) over 97 percent of the Navy's commanding officers conduct themselves honorably, the increasing number of those who do not raises concerns that the Navy must address. Alarms should be sounding at the highest levels of Navy leadership, but a review of recent literature reveals only a trickle of discussion on the subject of personal misconduct by military commanders. Instead of calling the service to action, a Navy spokesman said in January 2011 that there was "no indication that the reliefs are the result of any systemic problem."5
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6
ID:   122546


New normalcy: sea power and contingency operations in the twenty-first century / Watts, Robert B   Journal Article
Watts, Robert B Journal Article
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Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract In September 1994, the Caribbean nation of Haiti burst into political unrest that drove twenty-six thousand migrants out to sea on board overcrowded and unseaworthy craft in an unprecedented mass migration to the United States. Several months later, over thirty thousand Cubans followed suit, attempting to reach the mainland on literally anything that could float. On 31 August 2005, a "weapon of mass destruction" in the form of a category-five hurricane exploded in the Gulf coast city of New Orleans, killing over 1,300 citizens and forcing the evacuation of tens of thousands. Finally, on 20 April 2010, the Deepwater Horizon exploratory oil rig exploded, heralding an unprecedented environmental disaster whose final impact has yet to be determined.
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7
ID:   122550


Phase zero: how China exploits it, why United States does not... / McDonald, Scott D; Jones, Brock; Frazee, Jason M   Journal Article
McDonald, Scott D Journal Article
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Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract In October 2006 General Charles Wald, Deputy Commander U.S. European Command, brought "Phase Zero" into the joint lexicon with the publication of an article, "The Phase Zero Campaign."1 Over the last five years the concept of taking coordinated action in peacetime to affect the strategic environment has become widely accepted and is now integrated into theater campaign plans. These activities focus on building capacity of partners and influencing potential adversaries to avoid war. In contrast, Chinese strategic culture has encouraged taking actions to defeat an enemy prior to the onset of hostilities for two and a half millennia. This accounts, in part, for the manner in which the People's Republic of China (PRC) applies the elements of national power in the steady-state environment to advance its strategic interests. While the United States remains focused on preparing the environment and building partners, Chinese strategic culture states a preference for defeating an adversary before what Western thought thinks of as war has begun. This outlook ultimately places the PRC in a position of strategic advantage. To meet future challenges like that posed by the PRC, the United States should better integrate Phase Zero with contingency (crisis) planning, then design and execute operations in the steady-state environment that go beyond avoiding war and attempt to settle conflicts in accordance with the national interests of the United States.
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