| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The most common explanation for military victory and defeat is numerical preponderance. This is the causal assertion that the preponderant will use their material advantage optimally and win the military conflicts they engage in through attrition. When it comes to battle, more is better, whether it be troops in the field or raw economic potential. Regrettably, this big battalions theory has rarely been tested, particularly against a series of cases with great historical breadth. This article analyzes data from 754 battles spanning nearly 3,500 years, and contrasts these empirical details against the core hypotheses of preponderance theory. Unfortunately for the theory, the returns to preponderance are highly ambiguous. Historically, armies both large and small emerge victorious in nearly equal fashion-a result highly contrary to the theory's central claim.
"We are practically through the enemy's defences, the enemy has only flesh and blood against us."
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