Query Result Set
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:1415Hits:19398114Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

  Hide Options
Sort Order Items / Page
TWO - LEVEL GAME (2) answer(s).
 
SrlItem
1
ID:   172383


Dilemma of nuclear disarmament: the case of North Korea / Kim, Jina   Journal Article
Kim, Jina Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract The Hanoi summit between the US and North Korea failed not because of North Korea’s brinkmanship strategy or its miscalculation of the US position on the denuclearisation talks, but because of a fundamental issue: a dilemma of how much to yield in giving up its military capabilities to expedite the lifting of sanctions. The leadership in Pyongyang has concerns about the ‘deliverability’ of its promises to its domestic audience to ensure deterrence capabilities and economic recovery. The two-level game model explains why both sides keep minimising the range of options for the negotiations, increasing the risk that the talks will break down.
Key Words Disarmament  North Korea  Denuclearisation  Two - Level Game  Win - Set 
        Export Export
2
ID:   123009


Domestic scrutiny of European Union politics: between whistle blowing and opposition control / Finke, Daniel; Dannwolf, Tanja   Journal Article
Finke, Daniel Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract Some European law proposals are subject to scrutiny by national parliaments while others go unchecked. The analysis in this article indicates that the opposition scrutinises European Union law to gather information on the proceedings inside the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Yet whereas strong opposition parties scrutinise highly politicised law proposals, weak opposition parties tend to scrutinise those proposals that are negotiated under the non-transparent fast-track procedure. In addition, there is ample evidence that the leading minister initiates scrutiny in order to strengthen his or her intergovernmental bargaining leverage. Yet, this Schelling Conjecture presumes that the party of the minister is located between the expected bargaining position in the Council and the coalition partner. Any other domestic interest constellation could lead to scrutiny motivated by whistle blowing. However, an issue's salience helps us to separate the whistle blowing from the Schelling Conjecture.
        Export Export