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Modern View
TWO - LEVEL GAME
(2)
answer(s).
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Item
1
ID:
172383
Dilemma of nuclear disarmament: the case of North Korea
/ Kim, Jina
Kim, Jina
Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract
The Hanoi summit between the US and North Korea failed not because of North Korea’s brinkmanship strategy or its miscalculation of the US position on the denuclearisation talks, but because of a fundamental issue: a dilemma of how much to yield in giving up its military capabilities to expedite the lifting of sanctions. The leadership in Pyongyang has concerns about the ‘deliverability’ of its promises to its domestic audience to ensure deterrence capabilities and economic recovery. The two-level game model explains why both sides keep minimising the range of options for the negotiations, increasing the risk that the talks will break down.
Key Words
Disarmament
;
North Korea
;
Denuclearisation
;
Two - Level Game
;
Win - Set
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2
ID:
123009
Domestic scrutiny of European Union politics: between whistle blowing and opposition control
/ Finke, Daniel; Dannwolf, Tanja
Finke, Daniel
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2013.
Summary/Abstract
Some European law proposals are subject to scrutiny by national parliaments while others go unchecked. The analysis in this article indicates that the opposition scrutinises European Union law to gather information on the proceedings inside the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Yet whereas strong opposition parties scrutinise highly politicised law proposals, weak opposition parties tend to scrutinise those proposals that are negotiated under the non-transparent fast-track procedure. In addition, there is ample evidence that the leading minister initiates scrutiny in order to strengthen his or her intergovernmental bargaining leverage. Yet, this Schelling Conjecture presumes that the party of the minister is located between the expected bargaining position in the Council and the coalition partner. Any other domestic interest constellation could lead to scrutiny motivated by whistle blowing. However, an issue's salience helps us to separate the whistle blowing from the Schelling Conjecture.
Key Words
European Union
;
Delegation
;
Multilevel Governance
;
Legislative Politics
;
Two - Level Game
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