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| 1 |
ID:
181881
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| Summary/Abstract |
In their post-authoritarian period, civilian governments in transitional democracies have often been battered by unelected power centers. Where do these unelected forces derive their power? This article addresses this question through a case study of Pakistan. Since the 2018 elections, a decade after leaving formal political office, the Pakistani military has asserted greater control over civilian government. Using the concept of informal institutions of political participation as an analytical framework, we argue that when formal forms of control become untenable due to legitimacy and/or functional constraints, the military turns into a Janus-faced institution, visibly acting as a formal state organ while invisibly protecting its institutional interests through what we call “informal mechanisms.” The article explains how Pakistan’s pre-2018 political situation dictated a quasi-military regime more suited to the military’s interests than direct military rule.
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| 2 |
ID:
123037
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
More than 55,000 people were killed in Mexico's vicious drug wars between 2006 and 2011. The Pentagon's Joint Operating Environment Paper 2008 speculated that the country was one of two major states at risk of rapid and sudden collapse.
This paper investigates the causes of state failure and the extent to which these are present in Mexico today as a result of corruption and violent, lucrative transnational organised crime. It explains the mutual dependency between the two and shows how deeply entrenched and extensive their power and influence have become at all levels of government and in key state institutions. It examines progress in the National Security Strategy and the impact of crime and corruption on key strategic measures of success.
It concludes that the Pentagon's failure to understand the nature of the conflict led to a gross overstatement of the risk to the country. It also demonstrates, however, that crime and corruption threaten the transitional democracy that has emerged in Mexico since the turn of the century. Finally, it raises questions regarding the reliability and general applicability of some theories of state failure, state legitimacy and civil-military relations.
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| 3 |
ID:
134113
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper presents the strategic importance and implications of a truth commission in the context of South Africa. The limitations of a transitional democracy throw into relief the transitional circumstances of justice. A politically negotiated truth commission is a preferred mechanism, if not the most, for dealing with politically motivated crimes and human rights abuses. A truth commission builds on the concepts of transitional justice and transitional amnesty, thereby meshes with the concept of the rule of law. A truth commission, in its simultaneous and complementary role to retributive justice, can contribute in settling profound political and social conflicts in a country's history. The paper argues that a truth commission satisfies political, legal and ethical requirements simultaneously in a transitional setting. A truth commission can, to a great extent, resolve tensions between truth, justice and reconciliation and play an emancipator role towards democracy, although it can never guarantee truth, justice or reconciliation as they come up with a mixed package that includes a clear objective of ending violence, attending to social inequalities and individual and social readiness. This paper lays out many positive and negative aspects of a truth commission and suggests why a truth commission has increasing appeal. A truth commission may help to render truth, justice and reconciliation and can serve the causes of democracy as well.
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