|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
123038
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In the latter part of the 20th century, much academic attention has been devoted to the patterns of change in international power relations. From the legacy of imperialism to the end of the Cold War and the rise of American unipolarity, far-reaching geopolitical shifts have dramatically impacted the structure and composition of the international arena. Countries find themselves at the confluence of far-reaching developments such as the rise of supranational organisations, changes in migratory flux and the redistribution of power and influence between nation-states. This fluid and rapidly-changing international environment has provoked profound changes in how nation-states are perceived and perceive themselves. Questions of status and prestige have taken on new significance as shifts in traditional international power relations have challenged the historically-rooted narratives around which national identities are constructed. But how have nation-states responded to these global changes? What has been the effect on national identities? This article will explore the extent to which nuclear weapons policy in France and Russia reflects an attempt to reconcile narratives of national greatness with a gradual loss of influence and status in the international community.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
123036
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
South Africa has embraced the notion of a democracy in the early 1990s. Accepting democracy as a form of government also implied the embracement of military professionalism and international acceptable norms of behaviour for the South African military. The professional behaviour of the military in contemporary democracies is rooted in the acceptance of democratic values and the primacy of the citizen-soldier. Over time, democracies have developed and established certain ground rules for a 'fair' fight and, as far as possible, avoid involvement in protracted wars. The notions of jus ad bellum, jus in bello and, more recently, also the notion of jus post bellum are, in essence, the creation of modern democratic states. Because of these ground rules, democracies tend to emphasise the use of symmetrical forces aimed at delivering a decisive outcome in war. More important, though, is the development of a military ethos that is conducive to strategic effect in the conventional domain in general and military professionalism in particular.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
123037
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
More than 55,000 people were killed in Mexico's vicious drug wars between 2006 and 2011. The Pentagon's Joint Operating Environment Paper 2008 speculated that the country was one of two major states at risk of rapid and sudden collapse.
This paper investigates the causes of state failure and the extent to which these are present in Mexico today as a result of corruption and violent, lucrative transnational organised crime. It explains the mutual dependency between the two and shows how deeply entrenched and extensive their power and influence have become at all levels of government and in key state institutions. It examines progress in the National Security Strategy and the impact of crime and corruption on key strategic measures of success.
It concludes that the Pentagon's failure to understand the nature of the conflict led to a gross overstatement of the risk to the country. It also demonstrates, however, that crime and corruption threaten the transitional democracy that has emerged in Mexico since the turn of the century. Finally, it raises questions regarding the reliability and general applicability of some theories of state failure, state legitimacy and civil-military relations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
123035
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
There is no question that the First Libyan Campaign of 1940-41 was a military disaster for Italy. However, for all of the ethnic slurs and cultural stereotyping levelled at Italian military performance in North Africa by historians and popular authors alike, relatively little research effort invested into identifying the real military disadvantages under which Mussolini's soldiers in this theatre fought. When understood as a product of measurable and objective military factors, like the issue of leadership for example, the rout of the 10th Army takes on an entirely new complexion. The subsequent reputation of Italian soldiers as embarrassing battlefield liabilities in the Western Desert in this period is exposed as unfair. This overlooks the handicaps they fought under, and often ignores the bravery displayed in spite of them all. Like the Australians, the Italians in the Western Desert were ordinary men, no more and no less. In truth, it is singularly unsurprising that so many were killed or surrendered without putting up much real resistance. They faced challenges and conditions that would have handicapped troops from any country.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
123039
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
You have a row of dominos set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.
Dwight D. Eisenhower
For too long, we have lived with the "Vietnam Syndrome." Much of that syndrome has been created by the North Vietnamese aggressors who now threaten the peaceful people of Thailand. Over and over they told us for nearly 10 years that we were the aggressors bent on imperialistic conquests. They had a plan. It was to win in the field of propaganda here in America what they could not win on the field of battle in Vietnam. As the years dragged on, we were told that peace would come if we would simply stop interfering and go home. It is time we recognized that ours was, in truth, a noble cause. A small country newly free from colonial rule sought our help in establishing self-rule and the means of self-defense against a totalitarian neighbor bent on conquest. We dishonor the memory of 50,000 young Americans who died in that cause when we give way to feelings of guilt as if we were doing something shameful, and we have been shabby in our treatment of those who returned. They fought as well and as bravely as any Americans have ever fought in any war. They deserve our gratitude, our respect, and our continuing concern. There is a lesson for all of us in Vietnam. If we are forced to fight, we must have the means and the determination to prevail or we will not have what it takes to secure the peace. And while we are at it, let us tell those who fought in that war that we will never again ask young men to fight and possibly die in a war our government is afraid to let them win.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
123040
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In November 1996, one of Africa's cruelest insurgent leaders, Foday Sankoh, conceded defeat and agreed to sign a peace treaty with the Government of Sierra Leone to halt that country's then-seven year long civil war. Sankoh's decision to stop fighting was not born out of a sense of goodwill toward his government or a shift in his political objectives. Rather, he agreed to make peace because his thousands-strong insurgency, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), had been soundly defeated in a series of clashes against Executive Outcomes (EO), a mercenary force that fielded a mere 250 personnel. Seeking to explain this turn of events, a number of scholars have alleged that the mercenaries prevailed because they had access to more and better weapons than the RUF and, thus, made up for their lack of men with superiority in materiel. 1 Christopher Wrigley, for instance, argued that Executive Outcomes defeated the RUF, 'because it relied on sudden strikes made possible by its helicopters, which provided both transport and covering fire'. 2 Abdel-Fatau Musah, similarly, argued that EO succeeded in Sierra Leone because its 'air power' allowed it to deal, 'telling blows to the RUF on several fronts'. 3 Referring not only to EO's air assets, but also to its armored infantry fighting vehicles, Elizabeth Rubin concluded that the RUF, 'were overwhelmed by EO's superior firepower'. 4 Jacob Akol, likewise, concluded that, 'the RUF were overwhelmed by EO's firepower'. 5 These opinions are well-known to the mercenaries who took part in this conflict, one of whom acknowledged that, 'the world thinks that Executive Outcomes was successful because of the use of overwhelming technology and superior firepower'.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|