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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
123092
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
JAE HYEOK SHIN analyzes cabinet duration in ten presidential democracies in Latin America. He ?nds that cabinet attributes greatly affect cabinet durability and that the performance of the cabinet has larger effects on its stability than do its handling of exogenous crises.
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| 2 |
ID:
185977
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| Summary/Abstract |
The literature on South Korean elections has shown that voters’ region, ideology, and generation shape their preferences at the polls. Few studies, however, have investigated the long-term effects of these variables or the difference in the effects of ideology and generation between regions. In this article, we generate theoretical expectations of Korean voters’ voting behavior, analyzing cleavage structures in the party system since democratization, and we then examine the interactive effects of region with ideology and generation across voters from Gyeongsang and Jeolla, in six presidential elections from 1992 to 2017. We find that ideology and generation have stronger effects among Gyeongsang voters than among Jeolla voters. To be specific, ideology and generation often divide Gyeongsang voters, especially when the Democratic Party nominates a presidential candidate from Gyeongsang; Jeolla voters are more homogeneous in their support for the party, regardless of their ideology and generation.
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| 3 |
ID:
137209
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this article I seek to explain the microfoundations of patronage politics in the developing world. Two distinct approaches have evolved in the literature. One puts emphasis on the demand side, arguing that patronage persists because poor voters tend to desire individualistic goods over policy. The other focuses on the supply side: few politicians offer programmatic policy, so voters have no alternative but to vote for the politicians who distribute patronage. In this study I test those competing theories using original data from Jakarta, Indonesia. I find evidence supporting the demand-side theory: when both patronage and policy are offered, poor, less-educated voters tend to demand patronage, such as jobs and money, over national programs like free education and universal health care, whereas well-off, better-educated voters tend to prefer the national policies. However, the study also reveals that demands for patronage are affected by level of participation in politics: those who voted in previous elections and those who affiliate with a political party are more likely to demand patronage. This microfoundational evidence helps to explain the persistence of patronage politics in places of widespread poverty.
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