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ID:
136621
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| Summary/Abstract |
Cambodia and Myanmar are both identified as “pro-China” Indochinese countries with regimes that rely on political support and economic investment from Beijing. Cambodia and Myanmar, therefore, have become testing grounds for China’s new soft power initiative of “spreading cultural understanding” by means of the establishment of Confucius Institutes. China’s relations with both Cambodia and Myanmar are improving, but local responses to the Confucius Institute initiative differ in the two countries. Phnom Penh has one Confucius Institute and three Confucius Classrooms equipped with thirteen Chinese language teaching stations, including those installed in the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces Academy and the Office of the Prime Minister. The initiative is enthusiastically championed by government and political leaders. In the case of Myanmar, three Confucius Classrooms, rather than Confucius Institutes, have been established by ethnic Chinese associations in Yangon and Mandalay. Lacking governmental endorsement, these Confucius Classrooms need to keep a low profile. The aim of this article is to differentiate between the politics of dependency in China-Cambodia and China-Myanmar relations by exploring local contexts and responses to Beijing’s soft power initiatives.
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| 2 |
ID:
123108
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the face of a rising China, some scholars have argued that ASEAN countries will choose to either bandwagon with or balance against China, while others believe they will respond with a more moderate policy known as 'hedging'. In considering these options, ASEAN countries must take into account their individual interests within the economic and security structure of this region. In this research, we argue that each ASEAN country confronts divergent sets of security and economic relations with China, which play a major role in shaping their policy responses. We can characterize their responses into four quadrants. Each cell can be categorized in terms of a high or low degree of threat perception (HT or LT) from China, as well as a positive or negative economic expectation (PE or NE) with China. We thus hypothesize that ASEAN countries in the HT-NE situation will balance against China; those in the LT-PE situation will bandwagon with China; those in the HT-PE or LT-NE situations will hedge against China. Hypotheses are supported by three case studies, Vietnam-China (HT-NE), Cambodia-China (LT-PE) and Singapore-China (HT-PE) relations.
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| 3 |
ID:
192226
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article compares the ways Taiwan and South Korea have navigated the politics of soft power to gradually exert their influence in South and Southeast Asia. It then analyses Taiwan's self-declared ‘warm power' practices. The article is divided into five parts. The first highlights the conceptual evolution of soft power and new policy practices in Asia. The second discusses the transformation and strengthening from soft power to warm power. The third introduces South Korea's New Southern Policy through the lens of soft power. The fourth presents Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy, and the conclusion compares the impact and prospects of the two.
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