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| 1 |
ID:
123176
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The teleological narrative that has dominated the handling of intelligence by the British state in the events that led up to the 1916 Irish Rebellion in Dublin has been characterised as a cocktail of incompetence and mendacity. Using new and existing archive material this article argues that both the cabinet in London and key members of the Irish Executive in Dublin were supplied with accurate and timely intelligence by the Admiralty's signals intelligence unit, the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police with respect to this event. Far from being a failure of intelligence here is evidence to show that there occurred a failure of response on behalf of key decision-makers. The warnings that were given by intelligence organisations were filtered through the existing policy preferences and assumptions. As a result of these factors accurate evaluations and sound judgement were not exercised by key officials, such as Sir Matthew Nathan, in Dublin Castle.
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| 2 |
ID:
128638
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The author, in a three part series examines the evolution of naval warfighting doctrine, with examples, and seeks to set out a grammar of doctrine.
Within the context of the present highly complex and shifting environment and in the face rapid technological change, it is not unreasonable to question the validity of doctrine - Albert Palazzo -2008
Knowing the enemy is the bedrock of the business of strategy: strategic theories in comparison, are second order problems. To concentrate on doctrine before enemies is to put the theoretical cart before the actual horse -a double error - Ken Booth, 1979
Doctrine is the box outside of which we need to think- Colonel Rory Copinger, Symes, Royal Marine-2010
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| 3 |
ID:
128659
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the second part of his series of articles, the author examines the development of naval doctrine through the 18th century, culminating in the production and publication of the fighting doctrine which informed the first world war, and governed the conduct of the battle of Jutland in 1916
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| 4 |
ID:
128720
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this the concluding part of his series on the chemistry of doctrine, the author examines the further evolution of naval doctrine during the second world war, with specific reference to the battle of Atlantic . He concludes by surveying the whole three part series and drawing some enduring lessons and principles.
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