| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
123276
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Both inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) have implications for the wage rates of home-country workers. Such implications have been particularly noteworthy in Japan where the traditional internal labor-market practices, which value long-term sustainability of employment and wages, collide with the pressure for change in the globalizing Japanese economy on many fronts. In this paper we estimate the impacts of FDI on workers' wages in Japanese manufacturing industries. We find that Japanese employees benefit, in the form of wage gains, from their employers' association with both inward and outward FDI operations. These wage effects differ systematically depending on gender and worker ranks within their employer firms and are likely to weaken the mechanisms underlying the sustainability of Japanese firms' traditional internal labor markets. The presence of FDI effects on worker wages also implies an increasing disparity between the incomes of workers who work for successfully globalizing firms and workers who do not, jeopardizing Japan's traditional policy objective to sustain harmonious economic growth across all economic sectors. This would also deepen the structural divide including the wage gap of the Japanese economy that exists between large firms and small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) since firms which get involved in FDIs are mostly large firms.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
187840
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This paper shows the optimality of a two-tier linear salary scheme in internal labor markets and identifies conditions under which discretionary promotion is better than rule-based promotion and vice versa. Our main findings are: (1) regardless of whether discretionary promotion or rule-based promotion is used, a two-tier salary scheme is optimal; (2) the salary is contingent on promotion, which is fixed before and linear after promotion; (3) if the difference in human capital among agents is small, discretionary promotion is superior; (4) if the expected replacement cost of human capital is high, discretionary promotion is superior; (5) if the risk of facing/incurring a high replacement cost of human capital is high, discretionary promotion is superior; (6) if the chance of having a high human capital agent is high, rule-based promotion is likely to be superior; and (7) if the productivity improvement from a job promotion is large, rule-based promotion is likely to be superior. We have also found empirical evidence in support of our theory on the two-tier salary scheme.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|