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| 1 |
ID:
183044
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| Summary/Abstract |
Electricity distribution prices have steeply increased in Finland since 2015. This research investigates the returns from the Finnish low-voltage electricity distribution business and compares them to returns from three European industry indices. The within-industry distribution of returns is also studied. The Finnish rate of return regulation model used is presented together with the level of allowed returns by the model, four changes to the model are proposed, and the effect of the four proposed changes on the returns allowed by the model are investigated.
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| 2 |
ID:
123279
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper has studied electricity pricing under a regulated structure during post power sector reform in Odisha, India. It is found that Odisha has adopted the average cost pricing principle for determining electricity price with the rate of return regulation. This process of tariff determination not only takes a long time but also involves huge cost. Further, actual tariffs levied by the Odisha Electricity Regulatory Commission (OERC) are at variance with the broad principles of rational pricing policy. This uneconomic pricing policy has adverse impact on the financial health of the distribution companies. However, the Electricity Act of 2003 has brought about a radical change in the power scenario across the country, including the state of Odisha, by introducing open access and trading of power.
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| 3 |
ID:
168682
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| Summary/Abstract |
Based on a database of U.S. electric utility rate cases spanning nearly four decades, the returns on equity authorized by regulators have exhibited a large and growing premium over the riskless rate of return. This growing premium does not appear to be explained by traditional asset-pricing models, often in direct contrast to regulators’ stated intent. We suggest possible alternative explanations drawn from finance, public policy, public choice, and the behavioral economics literature. However, absent some normative justification for this premium, it would appear that regulators are authorizing excessive returns on equity to utility investors and that these excess returns translate into tangible profits for utility firms.
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