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| 1 |
ID:
130443
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How do authoritarian elections affect voters' attitudes toward the regime and their support for democracy? This article draws upon the case of village elections in China to argue that elections may have two simultaneous effects. First, free and fair elections increase citizens' confidence in the government. Second, elections also allow voters to exercise political rights and accumulate democratic experience through participation, and this in turn may trigger greater demand for further empowerment. Empirical analysis of data from a two-round nationwide survey conducted in 114 villages confirms both effects. One implication of these findings is that competitive elections may simultaneously boost regime popularity and increase public demand for further democratic reform.
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| 2 |
ID:
176604
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| Summary/Abstract |
The existing literature identifies campaigns as an important tool of policy implementation for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, scholars have yet to reach agreement about the effects of campaigns on policy outcomes. This article helps to provide answers through an analysis of an affordable housing campaign adopted by the central government between 2011 and 2015. My findings are confirmed using regression analysis of a large original data set that I compiled. The article finds that the campaign strengthened the political incentives for local officials and that they responded to the campaign by building more affordable housing. But the campaign’s effects varied across different types of localities, which led to a significant mismatch between the allocation of government resources and the actual needs of local residents. These findings point to the defects of campaign-style implementation and China’s need for more institutionalized mechanisms to implement policies prioritized by the national government.
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| 3 |
ID:
128940
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Extant literature on authoritarian legislatures argues that dictators set up quasi-democratic institutions to co-opt opposition and attract investors. We argue that dictators also nurture clientelistic ties with social groups useful to their rule, a previously overlooked function of authoritarian legislatures. Drawing on the case of Chinese local legislatures-namely, the local People's Congress and the local People's Political Consultative Conference-we find that Chinese local governments use these institutions to channel patronage to and gain political support from the private sector. Field interviews and an analysis of a nationwide firm-level survey show that private firms owned by local legislative members, while obtaining more bank loans, provide more support to the local government in various forms than those owned by nonmembers. This finding suggests that authoritarian legislatures, even those with weak policymaking efficacy, can help authoritarian states build stable alliances with social groups, thereby contributing to regime resilience.
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| 4 |
ID:
123695
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A 'dual-power structure' governs the Chinese countryside. Branch committees of the Chinese Communist Party, traditionally the centers of power in the villages, increasingly share their authority with elected villagers' committees. Seeking to illuminate the factors contributing to the division of authority between these 'two committees', we view Party branch secretaries and the chairs of villagers' committees as the agents of two distinct principals. Party branch secretaries tend to derive their authority from township authorities, while villagers' committee chairs derive theirs from their village electorates. We predict that the division of authority between the two committees varies with (a) the relative levels of activism exhibited by the principals; and (b) the perceived legitimacy of the agents, as determined by their method of s/election. Through analysis of a unique dataset, we test four hypotheses derived from this framework. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the 'exercise of power' in rural China and shed light on the dynamics of China's political evolution.
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| 5 |
ID:
139849
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the government’s decades-long enforcement efforts, violations of land laws and regulations remain a serious problem in China. Local governments have often been blamed. This article identifies a previously overlooked reason for large-scale violations, by examining the enforcement behavior of the central government. It argues that the government enforces land regulations selectively, depending on the violators’ political status. The article focuses on the national policy prohibiting new golf course construction, finding that golf course developers connected with high-level political élites are more likely to violate the prohibition and survive subsequent enforcement actions by the central government. This finding contributes to the literature on regulatory enforcement in authoritarian regimes and has broad implications for reforms in China.
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