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RURAL ECONOMICS (2) answer(s).
 
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1
ID:   123695


Patterns of authority and governance in rural China: who's in charge? why? / Sun, Xin; Warner, Travis J; Yang, Dali L; Liu, Mingxing   Journal Article
Yang, Dali L Journal Article
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Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract A 'dual-power structure' governs the Chinese countryside. Branch committees of the Chinese Communist Party, traditionally the centers of power in the villages, increasingly share their authority with elected villagers' committees. Seeking to illuminate the factors contributing to the division of authority between these 'two committees', we view Party branch secretaries and the chairs of villagers' committees as the agents of two distinct principals. Party branch secretaries tend to derive their authority from township authorities, while villagers' committee chairs derive theirs from their village electorates. We predict that the division of authority between the two committees varies with (a) the relative levels of activism exhibited by the principals; and (b) the perceived legitimacy of the agents, as determined by their method of s/election. Through analysis of a unique dataset, we test four hypotheses derived from this framework. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the 'exercise of power' in rural China and shed light on the dynamics of China's political evolution.
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2
ID:   123361


Survival strategies of township governments in rural China: from predatory taxation to land trade / Takeuchi, Hiroki   Journal Article
Takeuchi, Hiroki Journal Article
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Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract Based on my fieldwork in rural China in 2004-2005, where I conducted semi-structured interviews with 108 local cadres and villagers, this article explores the survival strategies of township governments as the most recent tax reforms (i.e. the tax-for-fee reform and the abolition of the agricultural tax) have been implemented since 2000. It argues that township governments have taken adaptive strategies to maintain over-quota personnel even under pressure to reduce it. It finds that the strategies have changed from predatory taxation in the 1990s to land trade in the last decade, while the implementation of the rural tax reforms has brought fiscal crises in agricultural villages. Local officials have a limited incentive to respond to collective resistance on taxation but do not have the same incentive on land disputes.
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