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ID:
093994
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| 2 |
ID:
074459
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| 3 |
ID:
046546
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| Publication |
Jaipur, Pointer publishers, 2002.
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| Description |
xxviii, 329p.
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| Standard Number |
8171322972
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 045423 | 355/PAR 045423 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
110674
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| 5 |
ID:
129964
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| 6 |
ID:
104522
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| 7 |
ID:
073732
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| 8 |
ID:
060832
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| Publication |
Nov-Dec 2004.
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| 9 |
ID:
146619
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| Contents |
The Kargil Conflict had fortuitously brought to the centre-stage the need for an integrated approach towards intelligence gathering and joint operations. The 26//11 Mumbai attack has woken us to the reality of a unified approach between the states, the Coast Guard and the Indian Navy. The Defence Procurement Procedures over the years have tried to bring transparency into our procurement process and there have been some moves towards increasing private sector participation in defence manufacturing. However, unlike automotives and telecom sector, the relationship between the DPSUs, the DRDO and the private sector remain uneasy and adversarial. The DPSUs still do not consider the private sector as partners but as contractors.The record of private sector players such as L&T in strategic programmes like that of Arihant is salutary. A defence capability improvement would need major structural change.Either we have a DGA-like structure or the COCO structure of the USA with the government providing oversight on strategic issues.
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| 10 |
ID:
102203
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| 11 |
ID:
115453
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Harper Collins Publishers, 2007.
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| Description |
ix,252p.
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| Standard Number |
9788172237318
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056849 | 327.1/CHA 056849 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 12 |
ID:
128673
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| 13 |
ID:
019381
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| Publication |
Winter 2000.
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| Description |
189-206
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| 14 |
ID:
132160
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| Publication |
Noida, HarperCollins Publishers, 2013.
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| Description |
xvii, 300p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
9789351160830
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 057807 | 355.033554/MAL 057807 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 15 |
ID:
114842
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| 16 |
ID:
074458
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| 17 |
ID:
166425
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| Publication |
New Delhi, KW Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2019.
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| Description |
xxi, 222p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9789389137132
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059676 | 355.0254095491/CHA 059676 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 059677 | 355.0254095491/CHA 059677 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 18 |
ID:
080111
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1999 India and Pakistan engaged in a limited war in the Himalayan peaks of Kashmir. Pakistani irregulars occupied territory in the Indian-held district of Kargil. A campaign that lasted 74 days and cost each side more than 1,000 casualties concluded with India in control of the commanding heights around Kargil. The conflict exposed flaws in the Indian armed forces as well as enduring truths of combat in the high mountains. Political constraints combined with the unforgiving environment and a determined enemy to diminish India's military advantage. Transition from counterinsurgency to high-intensity combat in the Himalayas proved to be a daunting task. Early failure was only overcome through innovation and adaptation to the environment. Specialised forces, unconventional techniques and the focused application of overwhelming firepower ultimately secured victory
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| 19 |
ID:
093141
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| 20 |
ID:
055300
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| Publication |
2002.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In response to Pakistan's covert intervention in Kashmir, India sought to shed its perceived strategic paralysis by a strategy of compellence. While September 11 created a favorable international environment for military action against terrorists and their sponsors, accelerating terrorist attacks propelled Indian policymakers toward a military response. India gave effect to a newly developed concept of limited war by means of a military build-up designed to compel Pakistan both directly and indirectly (through the United States) to reverse its commitment to intervention in Kashmir. Such a strategy is flawed: concessions extracted can be withdrawn at any time, and brinkmanship risks loss of control and the outbreak of war between nuclear weapon states, with potentially horrific results.
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