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Modern View
POLITICAL BUSINESS
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
123625
Monetary institutions and the political survival of democratic
/ Clark, William R; Golder, Sona N; Poast, Paul
Golder, Sona N
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2013.
Summary/Abstract
According to the political business cycle literature, survival-maximizing leaders will manipulate whatever macroeconomic policy instruments they have at their disposal in order to retain power. However, an obvious implication of the political business cycle literature has not previously been adequately tested: does having the ability to manipulate macroeconomic policy instruments actually allow leaders to stay in office longer? We argue that elected leaders who have neither fiscal nor monetary instruments available for electoral purposes will find it more difficult to survive in office. We test this claim using data from 19 OECD countries in the latter part of the twentieth century when the degree of capital mobility in the international economy was high. We find that access to macroeconomic instruments does help leaders retain office, but that these instruments are only effective for leaders who have been in office for at least 7 years.
Key Words
OECD
;
International Economy
;
Macroeconomic Policy
;
Political Business
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2
ID:
133102
When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: brute causes of the civil war in South Sudan
/ Waal, Alex de
Waal, Alex De
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2014.
Summary/Abstract
South Sudan obtained independence in July 2011 as a kleptocracy - a militarized, corrupt neo-patrimonial system of governance. By the time of independence, the South Sudanese "political marketplace" was so expensive that the country's comparatively copious revenue was consumed by the military-political patronage system, with almost nothing left for public services, development or institution building. The efforts of national technocrats and foreign donors produced bubbles of institutional integrity but the system as a whole was entirely resistant to reform. The January 2012 shutdown of oil production bankrupted the system. Even an experienced and talented political business manager would have struggled, and President Salva Kiir did not display the required skills. No sooner had shots been fired than the compact holding the SPLA together fell apart and civil war ensued. Drawing upon long-term observation of elite politics in South Sudan, this article explains both the roots of kleptocratic government and its dire consequences.
Key Words
Violence
;
Foreign Aid
;
Economic Cooperation
;
Political Elite
;
Economic Interest
;
Political Marketplace
;
South Sudan
;
Political Business
;
Neo-Patrimonial System
;
Patronage System
;
Civil War
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