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ID:
153895
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) is a unique bilateral nonproliferation regime created by Brazil and Argentina after a long process of negotiations and confidence building. The creation of the agency in July 1991 marked a paradigmatic shift in the Brazilian-Argentine relationship, converting their long rivalry into a profound strategic partnership. This article presents a historical overview of the creation of ABACC and discusses how it paved the way for the integration of Brazil and Argentina into the nonproliferation regime. The article also shows how ABACC tackled nonproliferation challenges in the twenty-first century, helping Brazil and Argentina continue their nuclear programs with fewer risks to the autonomy and development goals traditionally defended in their foreign policies.
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| 2 |
ID:
153892
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article addresses the historical relations between Brazil and the international nonproliferation regime. It also discusses the current position of the Brazilian government regarding the Additional Protocol and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as some aspects of the Brazilian nuclear program.
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| 3 |
ID:
153896
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| Summary/Abstract |
Brazil, a developing country with an advanced nuclear program, presents an interesting case for observers of nuclear politics. Brazil is one of a handful of countries that possess uranium-enrichment technology, one of three countries in Latin America that produce nuclear power, and the only country without nuclear weapons to pursue an ambitious nuclear-powered submarine program. Among external views on Brazil's nuclear politics, the perceptions of Argentina and the United States matter most. With Argentina, Brazil shares responsibility for regional security. The two countries’ commitment to a bilateral nuclear safeguards arrangement contributes to a peaceful environment in the region. The United States will continue to set the tone in global nuclear matters and thus its views of Brazil's role in the nuclear field will continue to matter to Brasília, even as Brazil's political and economic crises have thrown the country’s nuclear future into uncertain territory.
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| 4 |
ID:
128773
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| Publication |
2013-14.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The law of armed conflict has often been described as outdated and ill suited to military conflict in the twenty-first century. Both academics and practitioners have argued that today`s wars tend to be asymmetric conflict between states and nonstate actors, whereas the law of armed conflict was made with a view to symmetrical interstates war. This article challenges that notion.
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| 5 |
ID:
143306
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| Summary/Abstract |
The present international standard allows non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to forego safeguards when nuclear material is used in a “non-proscribed military activity,” though no criteria have been established to determine when NNWS can remove naval nuclear material from safeguards. Though at present, only nuclear-armed states possess nuclear submarines, the global nuclear naval landscape may soon change with the advancement of Brazil's fledgling program and the possible precedent it would set for other NNWS. A framework is needed to shore up nuclear security and prevent nuclear material diversion from the nuclear naval sector. Proposed and existing nonproliferation frameworks, including a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and commitments through the nuclear security summits, are insufficient to close this loophole. A Naval Use Safeguards Agreement (NUSA), modeled after the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency, would provide a framework to remove the opacity surrounding nuclear material in the naval sector. Designed for NNWS and encouraged as confidence-building measures for nuclear weapon states, NUSA would explicitly outline those stages in the naval nuclear fuel cycle where safeguards are to be applied and in what context. This viewpoint also further provides direction for targeted research and development in technical naval nuclear safeguards solutions.
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| 6 |
ID:
123691
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
AbstractSouth Africa was one of the first states to conclude an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2002, allowing the IAEA greater right of access to safeguard nuclear activities and material. In light of this, some observers in the arms control community find it odd that South Africa's representatives at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) would be the main objectors to making the conclusion of an Additional Protocol a precondition for states wishing to import uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology (classified as sensitive nuclear technology and material). The South African objection should be viewed as only the most recent in a series of objections to measures that may seem obviously in line with nuclear non-proliferation. This emerging pattern in South Africa's nuclear diplomacy and, more specifically, the objection to the Additional Protocol condition are related to its membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and can be investigated through the lens of a politics of denial. Denial is the act of saying "no", but it is also in psychological parlance the unconscious thought process manifesting a refusal to acknowledge the existence of certain unpleasant aspects of external reality. It will be argued that South Africa's opposition to the Additional Protocol condition can be explained in the context of two instances of denial: (i) a perceived denial by the nuclear haves of what the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty codifies as an inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology - something that South Africa is cautious to be complicit in; and (ii) the nuclear weapon states' denial (the psychological meaning) of the unpleasant reality of a hypocritical nuclear order - something that South Africa wants to expose or at least something with which to engage to limit the effects for itself and other NAM members. The politics of denial does not yield to a pragmatist/utopian dichotomy in the nuclear realm, but instead reveals the dialectic nature of realism and idealism in nuclear politics, especially as reflected in South Africa's nuclear diplomacy.
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