|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
178370
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The causes and consequences of ceasefires have become a burgeoning area of research. The concept of ceasefire success is integral to this research and plays a key role as either the dependent or independent variable in both qualitative and quantitative work. Despite its importance, it is not clear how ceasefire success should be conceptualized. This critically hampers the progress of theoretical and empirical research on ceasefires. This article offers a conceptual framework based on the central proposition that ceasefire success should be assessed in terms of two inter-related but conceptually distinct criteria: the immediate objective and the underlying purpose. The immediate objective, which is embedded in the definition of a ceasefire, is the cessation of hostilities (either permanently or temporarily). While all ceasefires share this objective, their underlying purpose, which is the reason for establishing the ceasefire, varies widely across cases. The immediate objective and the purpose, while conceptually distinct, are linked since the purpose informs the temporal and geographic scope of the cessation of hostilities. Based on this framework, we argue that researchers interested in ceasefire success need to clearly identify their assumptions and conceptual choices, which should take account of the political context of the ceasefires in question.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
148036
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines how civilian defense militias shape violence during civil war. We define civilian defense forces as a sedentary and defensive form of pro-government militia that incumbents often use to harness the participation of civilians during a counterinsurgency campaign. We argue that civilian defense forces reduce the problem of insurgent identification. This leads to a reduction in state violence against civilians. However, we also claim that these actors undermine civilian support for insurgents, which leads to an increase in rebel violence against civilians and overall intensification of conflict. A statistical analysis of government and rebel violence against civilians from 1981 to 2005 and a qualitative assessment of a civilian defense force operating in Iraq from 2005 to 2009 offer strong support for our theoretical claims. These findings provide further insight into pro-government militias and their effects on violence. They also have wider ethical implications for the use of civilian collaborators during civil war.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
193111
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Ceasefires are common in civil conflict. Yet we have surprisingly little comparative analysis of why and under what conditions they occur. A ceasefire provides temporary relief from the costs of conflict, but also generates its own costs. Building on this logic, we argue that conflict parties are more likely to accept the costs associated with a ceasefire when the conflict costs are greater, in particular, when: violence is intense; there are higher levels of ‘collateral damage’; and the parties lack international support. Second, we contend that ceasefires are also more likely in those periods in which the audience costs associated with entering into an arrangement are lower, specifically, when the parties have some form of ‘political cover’, such as during mediation. We find support for both arguments in an analysis of a new dataset capturing all ceasefire in civil conflict from 1989-2020, using a series of dyad fixed effect models.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
184197
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Mediation and peacekeeping are commonly used tools to manage conflict. To what extent are they complementary and effective instruments for ending violent conflicts? Generally, they are seen as distinct tools: mediation aims to facilitate negotiated settlements, while the goal of peacekeeping is to prevent agreements from collapsing. However, peacekeeping and mediation regularly occur simultaneously. Arguably, peacekeeping operations rely on continuing political processes, while peacekeepers create a context favorable for mediation and provide a valuable source of independent information. Using a variety of model specifications, including selection models, empirical evidence supports that (a) mediation rather than peacekeeping is key to halting hostilities, (b) mediation and peacekeeping are largely complementary, but (c) this complementarity is conditional: in the post-Cold War period, transformative peacekeeping boosted the effectiveness of mediation to halt civil wars. There is no evidence that peacekeeping on its own matters for ending conflict. Finally, counterfactual analysis shows the substantial impact of mediation and peacekeeping on the frequency of conflict.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
134479
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article assesses the effect that leveraging civilian defense force militias has on the dynamics of violence in civil war. We argue that the delegation of security and combat roles to local civilians shifts the primary targets of insurgent violence toward civilians, in an attempt to deter future defections, and re-establish control over the local population. This argument is assessed through an analysis of the Sunni Awakening and ancillary Sons of Iraq paramilitary program. The results suggest that at least in the Al-Anbar province of Iraq, the utilization of the civilian population in counterinsurgent roles had significant implications for the targets of insurgent violence.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
193116
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article introduces the Civil Conflict CeaseFire (CF) dataset. The CF data covers all ceasefires in civil conflict between 1989 and 2020, including multilateral, bilateral and unilateral arrangements, ranging from verbal arrangements to detailed written agreements. In total, the CF data includes 2202 ceasefires across 66 countries and 109 civil conflicts. The data feature information on the actors involved in the ceasefire, and the class, purpose, coverage, and end date of the ceasefire. The CF data provide an empirical basis to assess the conditions that give rise to ceasefires, how ceasefires affect the dynamics of conflict, and the role of a ceasefire in the peace process. This article presents the rationale underlying the data collection, the coding rules and procedures, and how this data can be used for analysis.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
147690
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Civil conflicts within oil-rich states tend to last longer but are less likely to be mediated and end in a peace agreement. This implies that oil-funded conflict is less likely to end through a mediated settlement, despite offering a greater opportunity for peaceful resolution. This article builds on this puzzle, focusing on the following research question: to what extent does the presence of non-lootable natural resources impact on the onset and outcome of civil war mediation? I argue that oil wealth raises the relative capacity of the incumbent, making it more challenging for insurgents to force mediation and gain the guarantees against defection that are needed to resolve the problem of credible commitment. This theory is tested on 319 civil conflict episodes between 1946 and 2004. The results support the argument that non-lootable natural resources exert a strong negative effect on both the onset and outcome of mediation. The analysis also reveals that the negative effect of petroleum wealth increases relative to a state’s hydrocarbon revenue (per capita). This is an important contribution to conflict research focused on natural resources that has previously overlooked the relationship between resource wealth and civil conflict management efforts.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
124111
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
To what extent does the relative strength of a rebel movement impact upon the likelihood of a peace settlement in civil conflict? This article argues that relatively stronger rebels are more likely to overcome the strategic bargaining problems that can prevent the resolution of war. Relatively strong insurgents are better equipped to significantly challenge core government interests and fundamentally threaten the survival of a regime. The incumbent's fear of future violence therefore makes mediation more likely to be undertaken in high-stakes conflicts between states and strong rebel groups. Relatively strong insurgencies are also those with the greatest leverage to negotiate enforcement mechanisms and the best equipped to defend themselves in the event that the government reneges on an agreement. This reduces the scale of the commitment problem and increases the probability of relatively strong rebel groups agreeing to a settlement with an incumbent. This argument is tested using dyadic data that capture the relative position of insurgents in civil war from 1946 to 2004. This represents an important methodological shift within the mediation literature, which has in the past largely relied upon aggregate country-level data. The results suggest that relatively stronger insurgents are more likely to force the state to open a mediation process and eventually concede some form of settlement. This is further evidence of the need to capture the dyadic relations between actors with fine-grained disaggregated data.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
172330
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Existing research reveals many of the ways pro-government militia (PGM) shape civil violence but overlooks how the ethno-political ties between the state and a PGM might influence these effects. We argue that co-ethnic militia (i.e., groups composed of the ruling elite’s ethnic kin) are relatively loyal irregular forces that multiply state military capacity. The greater loyalty of co-ethnic groups mitigates principal–agent problems but further polarizes ethnic communities, and as a result, co-ethnic PGMs are likely to be associated with longer and more intense civil conflict. We test this argument on a global sample of cases from 1989 to 2007 using new data capturing the ethnic ties of all PGMs. The results support our claims that co-ethnic militia are associated with more intense and longer civil conflict.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
178369
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Ceasefires are arrangements in which conflict parties commit to temporary or permanent cessation of violence.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
193112
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
How does the state’s behavior in negotiations with one non-state group influence the behavior of other non-state actors? We argue that the dynamics of different conflicts within the same country are interdependent, and that a state develops a reputation through its interactions with each conflict party. This reputation provides a valuable source of information that other groups use to judge the state’s cooperative intentions. When a state develops a reputation for cooperation, this increases the likelihood of (indirect) reciprocation from other groups. More specifically, we argue that when states enter into (and honor) a ceasefire with one rebel group, they demonstrate a credible reputation for cooperation. A credible reputation for cooperation, we posit, increases the likelihood that other conflict parties enter into ceasefires with the state, or that they de-escalate their military activities. We test our claims using the new civil conflict ceasefire dataset and find support for our argument.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|